The following article discusses Estonia-Russia relations in a broader, globalized world, not in the context of a simple national bilateralism. The aim of the article is not to analyze Estonian-Russian relations, but rather Russia-Estonia relations, with the greater emphasis on Russia and Estonia would be mentioned in general. The latter is due to a well-established practice where Russia’s official foreign policy statements and the address to the Baltic States, including Estonia, present Russia’s demands, however, sometimes – also the proposals in the 1990. Such circumstances have triggered reaction from Estonia. Without specifying Russia’s positions here and giving them no assessment (positive / negative), it must be admitted that Russia has been largely the initiator of these relations, but Estonia is rather a counter-reactant.
The analysis of Russian foreign policy is based on the following aspects and questions: First, how has Russia understood the globalized era[1] following the Cold War, how it has identified itself in this world, adapted to the new international system; and secondly, how Russia has realized its foreign policy in practice, including relations with Estonia, to understand the broader foreign policy of Russia in the 1990s and to define Estonia’s challenges in this system. Thus, the following article precludes an in-depth analysis of these specific transnational issues, on the grounds that, firstly, such approaches have already been presented in the previous decades of academic studies, especially in international scientific publications, and secondly, there is a risk that a description of the problems and their solutions will be presented instead of deeper analysis.
The article consists of four parts: the first one deals with Russia in the globalizing world, the other deals with Russia (and relations with Estonia) with Foreign Minister Kozyrev, the third with Primakov; fourth – Putin’s Russia and modern foreign policy and Estonia on Russia in a foreign policy context. A generalized approach to the topic reduces the proportion of subjective assessment, avoids the normative-ethical approach on a good-bad scale; right-wrong. The globalized background system of this article and the analysis from Russia allow us to highlight the backdrop of established relations.
Globalizing World and Russia.
Based on the books by Ian Fleming, Hollywood’s British super-agent 007 or James Bond, from the 1960s onwards, fought in a popular series a film of global peace in different parts of the world during the Cold War. Forty-fifty years later, Bond seems astonishingly modern and predictable, because the super-agent acted in an open and borderless geographical environment for the sake of overall peace and security and these are basically for the same purposes and in the same world as we are today. Indeed, the theorists of globalization claim that the process as such began in the 1960s (or perhaps, even more earlier) when massive technological inventions spread and metaphors of the “global village”[2] were introduced. Politically, however, this is a relatively new phenomenon.
Globalization is a combination of long-term and wide-ranging processes, involving almost all spheres of life, individuals, groups of individuals, countries and groups of countries by the the 21st century. It includes economic change, communication development, where time and space have gained new meaning. Basically, globalization is a contradictory process, where interactions between territories (but also countries and people, nations) coexist and at the same time the importance of the place and distances, the process not involving the whole world, and the multiplicity of cultures.[3] Globalization is not synonym to universal.
In international politics, globalization also means two interlinked tendencies – political-economic regionalization, concentration and grouping on the one hand, and increasing states (irrespective of the region) interdependence, border opening, mass culture, controlled and uncontrolled spread of technology and technology, and so on. Many countries in the world are linked to these trends, without the exception of Russia and Estonia.
After the collapse of the USSR, Russia was largely a transitional Soviet country, moving from Marxist-Leninist totalitarian/authoritarian ideology and regime to a new type of society and state, which gradually denied some of the previous period of history. For the foreign policy of Russia in the beginning of the 1990s, such overlapping of circumstances arose, where on the one hand the internal political and economic state organization as the domestic policy quickly changed, and on the other hand the whole international system, to which it had to adapt again, made Russia confused. This meant that while the other (democratic western) world countries were engaged in organization some kind of a mew international system, Russia was busy with its state and domestic arrangement. All in all, Russia was even in a paradoxical situation where Western European countries with long-standing democratic traditions opened their borders, but Russia had to close them (that is, transferred to conclude border agreements with its neighbors) to prove itself as a country. At the same time, the whole situation was cumbersome as it had problems with the unresolved territorial border with most of its neighbors from the Far East (Japan) to Norway. Russia is also referred to as a borderless country, and some analysts have highlighted only a few positive examples – Belarus, Mongolia and Lithuania[4], with whom such problems, either directly or indirectly influenced relations in 1990s. But this does not mean that there was no border with Russia or no border agreement with Russia. From the point of view of state theory and the practice of nation states, one of the hallmarks of both Russian and Estonian sovereignty was and is definitely a defined territory with a specific outline. In the 1990s Russia-Estonia relations, the border issue as such was the most bilateral in nature compared to other issues – the withdrawal of Russian troops, Russia accused less Estonia in human rights violations Estonians, as well as issues related to the Orthodox Church and its registration in Moscow, where more countries participated in the search for solutions. Efforts have been made to put an end to the border problem, mainly in the context of national bilateral relations, without involving third-fourth parties. The border treaty between the two countries is still not in effect.
Analyzes and Periodization of Russia in the 1990s.
Academic analyses of Russia from the 1990s may be divided into two part – first, the Western analyzes and second – studies by Russian-speaking authors. So we can talk about Western realistic and neo-realistic, functionalist and neo-functionalistic, liberal, neoliberal, institutionalist, congruent, and so on concepts and theories. In turn, Western analyzes are also divided into two – optimists and pessimists. The optimists thought that Russia’s revolutionary period in the early 1990s would not be followed by Russia’s war with another country, and Russia’s military aggression was reduced. Pessimists on the other hand – once again worked out Russia’s irrationality.[5] While the West’s analysis of Russian foreign policy in the early 1990s was somewhat confusing in some respects, the generalization of West dominated (actually glorification and the ultimate truth of the Western political models of democracy and all the related issues to that were largely presented in academic literature, in journalism, in political speeches).
Russian-speaking and Russian authors, however, largely focused on national interest, and consequently on geopolitics and on the idea of Eurasia. Geopolitics has also been considered a realist version for Russia[6], where “geopolitics is above all a framework for realism, especially through national interest, security and power/governance”.[7][8] The fact that Russia’s foreign policy and foreign policy research was dominated by geopolitics was not challenged neither by the West nor by Russia’s own analysts. The latter, in turn, also tried to classify geopolitics and offered different variants, such as subdivisions of old-minded (nostalgic to the Soviet Union); Modernist (new technologies etc.), Westerners who were less interested in direct geography because they were more oriented towards political, technological and economic development in the West) and simply Expansionists (such as A.Dugin’s empire-minded ideas). The expansionists themselves set a goal of geopolitical opposition to the dominance of the United States-led world, which meant that Pax America must necessarily resist Pax Eurasia, which was actually Pax Russia. Zbigniew Brzezinski noted in 1994 that “Russia cannot be either an empire or a democratic regime, but it can be both at once,”[9] clearly outlining Russia’s internal antinomy.
The contradiction has already been one of the most famous characteristic traits of Russia in history. In 1944, George F.Kennan, a US diplomat and scholar, characterized Russia as “today, more than ever – Russia remains a mystery to the world.” One might think that we do not know Russia, we have no knowledge of Russia, but it is wrong. We simply do not understand that Russia, unlike the Anglo-Saxon instinctive request for reconciliation, is living. The contradiction is the peculiarity of Russia… ”[10]
The controversy was also distinguished by Russia in the 1990s, when the US-dominated one-pole world was desperately offered as a counterweight to the multipolar world order, which in turn was strongly supported by China, France and a number of other countries (multilateralism). In the first half of the 1990s, an integrating Europe or the European Union was attempted to adopt the CIS, and by the beginning of the 21st century, some Russian analysts reached the traditional Russian perception that the country has been restrained by enemies: in the Far East Russia was threatened by the US and its strategic partner Japan, followed by China with its huge army, from the south – armed Islamic fundamentalists, and from the West, or Eastern Europe, the military NATO approached.[11]
Russia’s 1990s and its foreign policy must be seen at different stages of time: firstly we were in Yeltsin-led Russia in the political arrangement of the Russian Federation through its basic documents, and secondly – with Kozyrev (the first half of the decade) followed by J. Primakov’s foreign policy (second half of the decade). The so-called stand-alone era can be highlighted as Putin-Russia and his foreign policy.
From a foreign policy point of view, it is necessary to define a circle of Russian foreign policy makers for further analysis. In the early years of Yeltsin’s presidency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including the Ministry of Defense and the President’s Administration (Presidential Foreign Policy Advisers) competed in this field. 1996 became the main decision-making power under the leadership of the Foreign Ministry when Yevgeni Primakov became head of the Institution. In Putin-Russia, foreign policy has been concentrated in the presidential administration.
Classically, the first half of the 1990s has been referred to as a Wester-kind foreign policy, associated with Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev[12] and the second half of the decade with Yevgeny Primakov and his rigid realism, pragmatism with a retreat from former Western foreign policy. However, the periodization of Russia’s foreign policy activities in the 1990s is conditional, but periodization itself is necessary, because it allows for a more precise identification of Russia’s own and world identity, and hence its place in the world, resulting in Russia’s relations with other countries, including Estonia. The following Russian foreign policy temporal distinction divides it into Kozyrev, Primakov and Putin’s foreign policy.
The periodization of Russia’s foreign policy activities in the 1990s is conditional, but periodization itself is necessary, because it allows for a more precise identification of Russia’s own and world identity comprehensions, and hence its place in the world, resulting in Russia’s relations with other countries, including Estonia.
“Western” Kozyrev and foreign policy orientations
The beginning of Russia’s search of its place in the world may be readily considered as of June 12, 1990, when the Congress of People’s Deputies of Russia adopted a declaration of national sovereignty. In this document it was said that Russia “is a sovereign state created by historically united nations” and that its “sovereignty is a unique and necessary condition for Russian statehood”, as well as “VNSFV retains the right to leave the USSR.”[13] In this way, Russia, on the one hand, fixed its right to independence, but on the other hand it caused confusion with self-determination within the country. Following the official end of the USSR from the end of December 1991, Russia declared itself to be the successor to the Soviet Union, and found that it would automatically take the leading position of the former Eastern bloc in the world, and according to that importance, the rest of the world will also consider Russia as the leader of the former Communist Bloc. The self-esteem of independent Russia in the early 1990s greatly expressed the desire to emerge from the volatile domestic and foreign political chaos and the uncertainty of the transition period as a winner and a great state.
Western countries’ attitude towards Russia was twofold. First, during this period, President Boris Yeltsin was hoped to contribute to the implementation of Western democratic values and market economy principles in Russia, but on the other hand, US President George Bush announced in 1992 in a speech at the beginning of the State of the Union speech that the Cold War was over and it ended not just that simply, but was won by the United States. The countries of the world (like the US itself) see him as the (only) superpower of the world, then the US president continued that since the United States had declared itself triumphantly the only major superpower in the world, Russia (in the 20th century – USSR), who had been one of the central players in world politics since the Vienna Congress (1815), became a “second-rate” state at a glance.
Russia could not in any way pretend to be a second-rate former Soviet country in the world. At the same time, Russian population was about half smaller than that of the Soviet Union; Russia’s economic potential was also about half (also offered about 60%) of the economic capacity of the Union. Russia was territorially smaller than the USSR. Territories disappeared in the West – the Baltic States and also Ukraine and Belarus; South Caucasus and Central Asian countries. Russia was no longer surrounded by the ideological, geopolitical and military buffer zones of the socialist nations of the Union. Although in reality Russia had lost the Cold War, it had become from the superpower to an ordinary state, but with the exception of having a nuclear weapons, Russia could not psychologically imagine itself as a “non-unique and special state” in world politics.
In reality, Russia’s foreign policy picture was complicated throughout the 1990s, especially at the beginning. A.Kozyrev’s foreign policy was chaotic and sometimes illogical. It was alleged that Russia’s new (foreign) leadership did not have the knowledge of international relations and foreign policy that once characterized the leadership of the Soviet Union. For example, with regard to the foreign service and diplomacy, indeed, the situation in Russia was difficult here. Initially, Soviet diplomats were recruited, but many of them (especially the younger ones) moved to the private sector in the early years of Russia’s independence, because there was a higher salary for good international relations education, and Russian diplomacy lost personnel to the market economy in that time.
Andrei Kozyrev, who became Russian Foreign Minister before the breakdown of the Union, in the autumn of 1990, came from the Department of International Organizations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union, and in his vision, as well as in practical foreign policy, Russia played an important role in international organizations. For this reason, Russia, as the legal successor to the USSR, took a veto-standing permanent member position of the UN Security Council, which was accepted by the remaining CIS countries (and the permanent members of UN). Russia began energetic activities in the CSCE OSCE, and in 1991-1993, a minor challenge to NATO’s possible eastern enlargement was expressed by the desire to join NATO if possible. For example, Vice-President Rutskoi announced at a meeting with foreign diplomats in September,1991 that Russia’s accession to NATO is not probably excluded. Indeed, the prioritization of such a wide-ranging (global and regional) international organization shows geopolitical western (including the so-called “Atlantic”) orientation in foreign policy, which spatially did not overlap not only with Europe but with the broader Euro-Atlantic direction, meaning that interest was directed to both the European countries and the North America. In theory, Kozyrev’s foreign policy was referred to as (neo) liberal-institutionalist, where both the formal and substantive emphasis of foreign policy were placed on international institutions and organizations. Russia’s direct goal was to increase the importance of its membership in CSCE / The OSCE, to revise plan that saw the supremacy of Russia this international organization across Europe.[14]
On the other hand, there was no clear foreign policy orientation of Kozyrev in his attitude to President Yeltsin’s request in 1993 to draw up a document in the Foreign Ministry called “Russian Foreign Policy Concept”. Kozyrev objected in principle to this document, arguing that the Foreign Ministry should not deal with the drafting of foreign policy programming documents similarly to the CPSU. Considering Russia’s complicated domestic political situation and difficulties in self-identification, self-identification, where the communists-neo-Bolshevists, nationalists (“anti-modernist romantic nationalists”), liberals, the so-called internationalists and other, political forces were conflicting, and where there was no clearly fixed and coordinated internal policy, it was not possible to define a comprehensible foreign policy text. Thus, foreign policy became a mechanical series of actions that reacted primarily to the temporary positions, personalities and institutions of the internal power centers, and where often the negative attitudes towards certain states, such as Estonia, were concentrated. Having essentially lost its status as a superpower, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had a major psychological problem regarding Russia at the beginning of the 1990s as compared to the rest of the former Soviet Union because, first, they had abandoned their participation in the CIS and, secondly, the Western countries did not have them recognized de jure as a member of the Soviet Union. Thus, unlike Russia, the Baltic States were not new, but democracies with restored independence. The need to prove the undemocratic state of the Baltic States was certainly one of the additional reasons why the so-called “Western” foreign policy implemented by Russia and specifically Kozyrev in the early 1990s attacked Estonia and Latvia in alleged violations of human rights of the Russian-speaking population. This problem was raised in practically all international organizations important to Russia – the UN, CSCE/OSCE, CBSS, etc.
Politically, euphemism – a “near foreign abroad” that has caused great controversy in Russia was introduced, which essentially expressed Russia’s geopolitical interests and the sphere of influence on the desire of the fourteen former Soviet republics. The concept of the near abroad was long written in the Estonian press, politicians said their negative opinion. Konstantin Zatulin, chairman of the State Duma CIS Affairs Committee, proved the danger of the near abroad concept, claiming that “CIS policy is Russia’s internal affair, whether it likes anyone or not,” adding that “we [Russia] must win our special place in the near abroad.” In the spring of 1993, the Russian leadership found that there were direct and potential conflicts in the territory of the former Soviet Union and, for its part, offered the idea of creating a UN peacekeeping mechanism, becoming active in it. Russia’s peacekeeping idea did not find supporters abroad. But the concept of “near abroad” turned out to be very popular in Finland and it was developed from a number of geopolitical sub-variants – “new abroad,”[15] “nearest abroad,”[16] “distant abroad,”[17] A summary of Russia’s “near abroad” in the context of its derivatives was given by former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, who named the idea from Russia’s point of view – “temporary.”[18] In essence, in 1993-1996, Russia made great efforts to prove that the former Soviet Union and the states that were in disintegration fall within its sphere of influence and through the concept of “near abroad”.
Kozyrev “Western” foreign and the US.
The Russian-US relations between 1992 and 1994 have been compared with the US-US relations between 1945 and 1946, where both were overwhelmed by the supremacy of the United States in the world and where the future world order was unclear, as did USSR/Russia – US Relations.
Since in the initial liberation euphoria ended, many Russian politicians, journalists and analysts found that Russia, as the successor to the USSR, is not a superpower, then at least a superpower, close to the super-state, but on the other hand the US had defined itself as a superpower, and declaring that he is the only superpower in the world, then Russia was facing a dual problem: on the one hand, it was indeed a defeat, but on the other, it was not wanted to be recognized. The best way to prove yourself as a great power was to start working with the US in the framework of equal partnership. Some Russian scientists also analyzed the background of the United States in a new international context and the types of US international relations with other countries to clarify Russia’s comparable position. Thus, the group offered scientists (V.A.Kremenjuk, J.P.Davõdov, A.I.Utkin, B.I.Batjuk and T.A.Sakleina) in a collective monograph published in 1999 that US international relations can be typologized in the following way: allied relationships (related to NATO; ANZUS; Organization of American States and Individual-Allied Relations – Japan, South Korea, Philippines and Thailand, including special relationships – such as Canada and Great Britain); semi-allied relations (partnerships) with countries close to the US, which did not have direct special agreements with the US, but had a number of smaller agreements that transformed these countries into partners in the US, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan; friendly relations were with those countries that for some reason had not become US allies, but who kept close ties with the US, sharing common values. Also included were the so-called “neutral countries”, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Egypt, Tunisia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, etc .; moderately friendly countries – with countries that did not have conflicts with the US, but who, for various reasons, did not go for closer cooperation (for example, India); Neutral relations – with countries with no US economic or strategic interest, but these countries also did not challenge the United States (no negative, no positive) – most of the third world countries belonged here; hostile relations – with countries with which the US has conflicting relationships – such as Cuba, North Korea, Libya, Iraq.[19] No type of relationship was suitable for Russia. Being a nominally superpower (“великая держава”), he could not match himself to a given scheme and wished to have an equal relationship with the US, based on a solid Soviet-American contractual basis and overlapping interests of both countries.
In this context (in relations with the US – x country) the place of the Baltic States was also mentioned. Namely, after the declaration of independence, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania established good relations with the United States and were classified as semi-allied relations. As a result, the bilateral relations between Estonia and Russia were also sometimes trilateral (models – Estonia-Russia / USA or Estonia / USA-Russia), especially when it related to the negotiations on the withdrawal of former Soviet Union forces, subsequent Russian troops and the actual withdrawal of troops. 1994 summer.
The US’s wider foreign policy in the former Soviet Union was actively involved in the concentration of Russian armed forces and armaments (especially nuclear weapons) in Russia. The US was a direct participant in the process of abandoning Russia’s nuclear weapons in Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan and was indirectly involved in withdrawing of the former Soviet troops from the Baltic States. By 1994, when the military forces of the Baltic States made their own efforts, international assistance, the US-Russia relations had already undergone a complex development. “Romantic relations” (democratizing Russia and the common democratic values of the US and Russia in both internal and external policies; common historical and international perspectives) up to the “variations” of the partnership (simple partnership, solid partnership and strategic partnership) that all disappeared in the 1990s By the middle of the year, Russia’s persistent intense contradictions and divergences between the US and Russia’s international values and goals emerged. Some Russian analysts have also named the partnership with the US later as “premature partnership.”[20] Russia and its foreign policy reached a new stage of development.
Primakov – Russia as the center of Eurasia
In January of 1996, at a time when Russia-US partnership was already in decline, the three Baltic states, including Estonia, signed a joint “Partnership Agreement” with the USA. At about the same time, Russia’s “Western” Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev was replaced by the new Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, who became for a short period even Russian Prime Minister.
Primakov’s Minister of Foreign Affairs is characterized by a concentration of Russian foreign policy practically on CIS and theoretically on Eurasianism. He established and increased in the coordinating role of the Foreign Ministry; worked on reducing the intensity of US-Russia relations (raising arms control issues); the formation of the so-called “Primakov doctrine”. From the point of view of many analysts, Primakov’s doctrine was to disassociate Russia from “Western” foreign policy and its self-identification as a Eurasian superstate or Eurasian center. In essence, this meant the requirement to abandon the concept of the Cold War winners and losers, denial of the one-pole (US-centered) world, and the emphasis on Russian foreign policy relations to many regions of the world and countries, such as China and India.[21]
Primakov’s policy has been called realistic, dominated by the interests of Russia as a great Eurasian country. There were a number of politicians who supported Primakov’s ideas. In 1997, the then chairman of the State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee and former Russian Ambassador to the United States, V.Lukin, stated that Russia, like Kozyrev, does not have to slander from declaring Western states its own superpower and then allow everything, but it must be understood that Russia is counted where something depends. This means, for example, that if Russia does not depend on Africa or Latin America, its opinion will not be asked; and will not rush to the United States as a counterweight immediately. There have been both active periods and so-called breath times in Russian history. According to Lukin, the 1990s are Russia’s retreat era, when it is concentrated on internal politics, internal development.[22]
In a global sense, the key word in Russian foreign policy became multipolarity, which sought to counter the US vision of the world as a unipolarity and the so-called Pax Americana version. For example, practically all of the Russian Presidential meetings with China, India, France and other countries’ leaders emphasized the multipolarity of the world, or multiculturalism, which, regionally, reduced Russia’s specific relations with each country. Such an approach can be explained by Russia’s understanding of the decline in its place in a globalizing world and the explanation of internal identification through the comforting “Eurasian center”.
Primakov’s Baltic and Estonian foreign policy (also based on multipolarity and diversity) created many contradictory thoughts and analyzes. Based on Primakov’s basic positions, where Russia had more national interests than the western direction that was supposed to dominate the first half of the decade, and where the idea of Eurasianism was co-prioritized with CIS and Asian countries, the new foreign minister developed two straight-line policies with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. On the one hand, the argument was based on the human rights violation of the Russian-speaking population by Kozyrev and the Baltic states were divided into so-called different groups – good and bad countries, where Moscow-Vilnius relations were valued favorably, while Estonia (as well as Latvia) was criticized. Estonian politicians and analysts rated Primakov as an attempt on Baltic foreign policy to separate the Baltic States from each other.
On the other hand, Primakov very firmly responded to NATO enlargement, especially to the former Soviet Union, that is to say the Baltic States. His foreign policy period was the conclusion of the Russia-NATO Framework Agreement in 1997, which excited Estonia. Western analysts have often referred to it as Russia’s Mankind Document; an attempt to preserve the prospect of NATO enlargement by easing Russia’s opposition. Russia’s analysts have so defined the agreement. For example, conservative political scientist A.Migrayan raised a number of reasons why Russia should not have signed a framework agreement with NATO at the time: firstly, cooperation was an illusion; secondly, the decision on a possible enlargement of NATO has now rolled over to Russia itself; thirdly, the treaty was a prelude to NATO’s expansion into the territory of the former Soviet Union; fourthly, the treaty reduced the arguments against the expansion of NATO, and fifthly encouraged other countries to enter into similar agreements with NATO (for example, Ukraine). On the other hand, however, was there a logical question why Russia had signed it at all? In Russia, the positive nature of this base agreement was assessed as a prerequisite for trust in cooperation with Western countries and a possible pragmatic outcome of the Consultative Council established under the Russia-NATO Agreement. Particular emphasis was placed on the Consultative Council, and perhaps Russia hoped that the agreement would indeed stop NATO enlargement. However, in further developments, in the second half of the 1990s, Russia – NATO relations remained complex. In 1999, during the Kosovo crisis and war, relations were completely broken. In the same year, three former Eastern bloc countries – Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic – were invited to NATO. The Baltic States were not part of the enlargement circle, but getting a new invitation was not excluded.
Russian foreign and security concepts and military doctrine
In the second half of the 1990s, the development of official, general foreign, security and military documents was activated in Russia, which was largely initiated by Primakov and the Foreign Ministry led by him. Estonia and the other Baltic states were left behind in this policy both theoretically and in foreign policy practices.
The confusion of the beginning of the decade (many formal and informal concepts) was replaced by a series of new concepts – foreign policy, national security (1997). In 2000, the previous (1997) foreign and security concepts were replaced, and in addition, the Russian Defense Doctrine was adopted in spring 2000, which in turn replaced 1993. In September 2000, however, a four-forty page official document came out and it was the least talked document – the Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation. At the time of its adoption, Russia held a thorough debate and the Information Security Doctrine was criticized as an attempt to restrict freedom of expression. When the first documents – foreign and security concepts and defense doctrine come from the pre-Putin period, the Information Security Doctrine is a document of the Putin period.
Russian analysts distinguish foreign, security and defense policy in the following way: the foreign policy concept defines the country’s general policy goals in the world; defense doctrine – external threats and defenses; The Russian security concept covers both priorities, external and internal threats. Foreign and security concepts are complementary official positions.[23]
In these documents, Russia defined an international system for them, calling it a multipolar world where countries are politically, economically interdependent, and once again responding to the US’s desire to dominate the world as an unipolar leader. With regard to multipolarity, Russia foresaw the promotion of political relations with many countries, the integration of international economic institutions. Ignoring Russia’s interests meant increasing international insecurity and instability and stopping the world’s positive processes.
Russian national interests were fixed as individual (on an individual basis), societal (democratic society and consensus) and national (territorial unity, political, social and economic stability). The realization of national interests by the Russian security concept was supposed to be through economic promotion.
Russia’s security threats were fixed both nationally and internationally. High emphasis was placed on the first. Among the (international) threats on the other side, the role of the UN, the OSCE in international politics, the reduction of Russia’s political, economic and military influence on the world stage, NATO’s eastern enlargement, the weakening of the CIS integration processes and territorial demands on Russia were highlighted. In that document, which was drafted largely in 1999, when the war in Yugoslavia took place, Russia fixed itself as a military threat to NATO and the transition to military operations without the consent of the UN Security Council.
In a globalizing world, the United Nations, as the most important stabilizing institution in Russia, had been influenced by international influence in the meantime, but whose importance had to be restored.
As a regional (geopolitical) priority, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which the Russian leader Putin has named as the association of the dead-born states, was declared
In Europe, Russia’s greatest potential for the development and use of the OSCE saw the necessity and promotion of EU relations; attitudes towards NATO enlargement remained negative in the foreign policy concept (2000).
Estonia (together with Latvia and Lithuania) was also briefly outlined. With all three countries, Russia was interested in friendly cooperation, but it was noted that these three countries must firstly respect Russia’s national interests and, secondly, respect the rights of the Russian-speaking population. Three countries were not distinguished here, as was the case with Primakov’s foreign policy.
From other countries, Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept-2000 emphasized the need for dialogue with the US, China, India, Pakistan and the ASEAN.
Putin Russia.
The 21st century began with Russia’s new president, Vladimir Putin, whose personality and activities have remained controversial. Since Russia’s domestic and foreign policies have been central to history and a new Foreign Minister Ivanov, who succeeded Primakov was ridiculed by president Putin as head of a Travel Agency ready to carry out all logistics for Putin foreign travelling, however, without any possibility to say something important in foreign policy context, challenges. Anyway, for Putin domestic sphere of activities was again (as it had been for Yelstin in 1990s) of utmost priority.
As a new leader people around the world started to search historically suitable personal role models for Putin. Thus, some analysts (waiting for the good relations netween the West and Russia) proposed Peeter First, the Great who pragmatically interacted with Western countries, took over the technical-military-economic innovations of Europe and increased Russian positions in the world with the iron hand. The French newspaper “Liberation” brought many similar episodes at the time of the Russian President’s appointment in 2000 and the celebration of the Victory Day in Moscow, Stalin. Putin’s commemorative plaque opened for World War II heroes was first named “Joseph Stalin,” the Russian central bank gave Putin a coin with the image of Stalin, but Putin himself turned to war veterans with a Stalinist expression of “brothers and sisters”. Putin’s role models were even offered by Adolf Hitler. He was compared to President Charles de Gaulle because Putin promised to strengthen the presidential powers and government and to make a decisive contribution to Russia’s foreign policy by restoring Russia’s decisive position in the world. Michel Tatu, the former editor of the le Mond, however, named Putin rather a Napoleon-minded figure, who, after the final phase of the French Revolution – after the thermidorian reaction, “began to create order in the country”.[24] The French journalist added that, unlike the French state and commander, the Russian president would not conquer his neighbors. Putin himself has also considered Napoleon as a great role model.
In conclusion.
Firstly, Russia-US relations made a positive trend from neutrality to neutrality/negativity in the 1990s, starting with partnerships and ending with a series of problems in arms control issues. Russia – US relations were also linked to negotiations with Estonia on the withdrawal of Russian troops. Thus, Russia’s relations with Estonia formed part of the triangle Russia – Estonia/USA.
Secondly, Primakov’s (1996-1998) foreign policy vision of Russia in a globalizing world was based on a greater internal political consensus, where Russia was seen as a CIS and Eurasian state, a great state that acts as in a multipolar international system as the central player. Multipolarity was also brought in to the diplomacy with it the different approaches towards the Baltic states where relations with Lithuania were valued and Estonia and Latvia were criticized on the basis of the argument of violation of the rights of the Russian-speaking population.
Fourthly, Estonia-Russia relations was seen first and foremost as Russia-Estonia relations in the 1990s in connection with Russia’s especially aggressive policy towards the Baltic States and the initiator of relations (regardless of content) was usually Russia.
Fifthly, in the early 1990s, Russian-Estonian relations were dominated by the foreign policy of Russia’s self-search, which was implemented under the leadership of Foreign Minister Kozyrev (1990-1995). This foreign policy was chaotic and unclear, as he expressed internal politics for communists, nationalists, liberals, and others. At the same time performed conflicting perceptions of Russia in the international system and Russia’s practical foreign policy. In the Russian-Estonian relations, the human rights argument of the Russian-speaking population of Estonia was presented and Estonia’s democracy was challenged in various international organizations.
Fifthly, Primakov’s foreign policy contradicted NATO enlargement on the one hand, and an agreement with NATO on the basis of which the Consultative Council was established and hoped to suspend the enlargement process was agreed in May 1997.
Sixth, in the late 1990s, Russia’s foreign policy broke down between many problems in the Far East (Japan and the Kuril Islands; China and immigrants; Caucasus and Chechnya wars, relations with Georgia) to Europe (relations with Ukraine, questioning of the Union with Belarus) and in this multipolar, enlarged interest In Russia’s worldview, Estonia (as well as the other Baltic States) was not among the top priorities.
Seventh, in contrast to Estonia, there are currently four valid, official documents in Russia that all reflect the same theme – Russia’s national interests and its security, each with slightly different emphasis, but at the same time they are largely overlapping.
Finally, Putin’s pragmatic foreign policy continues the previous, multipolar foreign policy of the late 1990s, and there has been an improvement in relations with the US in the fight against international terrorism (although there are some substantive differences here); acceptance of NATO enlargement. Putin-Russia signed a new treaty with NATO – the NATO-Russia Council, in which Russia, in cooperation with NATO and the US, can demonstrate its importance in world politics in the fight against terrorism. Putin – Russia wants to equate itself with geopolitical power centers in Washington and Brussels. In some ways, in ten years, from 1992 to 2002, Russia has undergone three major stages – Kozyrev’s Western-style optimistic and hectic foreign policy through a cold realistic Eurasian approach (Primakov’s Russia-centered foreign policy), returning to the West (Europe, USA and NATO), allegedly pragmatic, and where Estonia is currently – in EU and in NATO that has reduced Putin-Russia’s mood and attacks in foreign policy and diplomacy.
REMARKS AND REFERENCES
[1] Word “globabalize” ja “globalism” were first used in 1944 “globalization” 1961. See Jan Aart Scholte, “The Globalization of world Politics”, in book Steve Smith ja John Baylis (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford University Press, 1997, p.14. A selection of Estonian-Russian relations see: David J.Smith, Artis Pabriks, Aldis Purs and Thomas Lane, The Baltic States (NY: Routledge, 2002); Walter C.Clemens, The Baltic Transformed, (Rowman and Littlefield, NY, 2001); Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda, eds., Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe (Vol.2. International and Transnational Factors, Oxford, 2001); George W.Breslauer, Russia, the Baltic States, and East-West Relations in Europe(EUI Working Papers RSC No.2000/11 Italy); Olav F.Knudsen, ed., Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region. Russian, Nordic and European Aspects (London: Frank Cass, 1999); Birthe Hansen and Bertle Heurlin, The Baltic States in World Politics (Curzon, 1998); Hans Mouritzen, Bordering Russia. Theory and Prospects for Europe’s Baltic Rim (Ashgate, 1998); Anton Steen, Between Past and Future: Elites, Democracy and the States in Post-Communist Countries. A Comparison of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Ashgate, 1997); Atis Lijins (toim.), Baltic States at the Turn of the 21st Century (Kikimora publications, Helsinki 1999); How Secure Are the Baltic States (Conference Proceedings. Riga, 1999); After Madrid and Amsterdam: Prospects for the Consolidation of Baltic Security (Conference Proceedings. Riga, 1998); NATO and the Baltic States – Quo Vadis? Conference Proceedings, Riga, (1997); Stephen J.Blank, NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States: What Can the Great Powers Do? Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, (1997); Visions of European Security – Focal Point Sweden and Northern Europe (Olof Palme International Center 1996); Anton Kukliński, toim., Baltic Europe in the Perspective of Global Change (Warszawa 1995); Andrus Park. “The Post-Soviet System States,” in: Proceedings of the Estonian Academy of Sciences. No.44/3. (1995), pp. 271-277; Andrus Park. “Russia and Estonia Security Dilemmas,” in: Proceedings of the Estonian Academy of Sciences. No.44/3, (1995), pp. 333-353; Andrus Park. “Fighting for the Mini State: Four Scenarios,” in: Proceedings of the Estonian Academy of Sciences, No.44/3. (1995), pp. 378-388; Pertti Joenniemi & Juris Prikulis (toim.). The Foreign Policies of the Baltic Countries: Basic Issues, (Center of Baltic-Nordic History and Political Studies. Riga 1994).
[2] See M.McLuhan, Understanding Media, (London: Routledge, 1964)
[3] Jan Aart Scholte, “The Globalization of world Politics”, raamatus Steve Smith ja John Baylis (toim.), The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations, (Oxford University Press, 1997), p.18.
[4] S.Mitin, “Russia Has No Borders,” nespaper Izvestija, (RIA-NOVOSTI. Daily Review. Issue 001, 19.03.1998); www.ria-novosti.ru. – [19.03.1998]
[5] Mette Skak. “Back in the USSR? Russia As an Actor in World Politics”; (DUPI working paper no.7,2000), http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/skm01/index.html – [20.07.2002]
[6] Helmut Hubel, “The European Union, the Baltic States and Post-Soviet Russia: Theoretical Problems and Possibilities for Developing Partnership Possibilities Relations in the North-Eastern Baltic Sea Region”, raamatus Olav F.Knudsen (toim.), Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region. Russian, Nordic and European Aspects”, (London, 1999), pp.241-256.
[8] C.Pursiainen, Russian Foreign Policy and International Theory, (Ashagte, 2000), p.55.
[9] Z.Brzezinski, “The Premature Partnership”, Foreign Affairs, (vol.73, no.2, 1994), p.72.
[10] George F.Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, (An Atlantic Monthly Press Book, Boston, 1967), p. 528.
[11] A.Kondrashov. “Россия в кольце, ” Neswpaper Аргументы и факты, (no.14 (April), 2001), p.20.
[12] Allen C.Lynch, “The Realism of Russia’s Foreign Policy, in journal Europe-Asia Studies, (vol 53, no.1, January 2001), pp. 7-32; A.P.Tsygankov, “Hard-Line Eurasianism and Russia’s Contending Geopolitical Perspectives,” Journal East European Quarterly, (vol.32, no.3, pp.315-334)
[13] “Декларация о государственном суверенитете РСФСР”, Newspaper Аргументы и факты, (No. 24, 16-June 22, 1990), p.1.
[14] http://www.ln.mid.ru/ns-dos.nsf/4b8edd3adb064e9f432569e70041fc52/432569d800223f3443256c30004772d5?OpenDocument – [15.11.2002]
[15] Ukraine and Byelorussia
[16] Former Eastern bloc
[17] Former foreign states for USSR
[18] Carl Bildt, “The Baltic Litmus Test,” Foreign Affairs (no. 73, 1994), p. 81.
[19] Ю.П.Давыдов., В.А.Кременюк, А.И.Уткин, В.И.Батюк, Т.А.Шаклеина. “Россия и США после “Холодной войны””, (М.:”Наука”, 1999), pp.4-5.
[20] С.Кортунов, “Российско-Американское партнерство и договор ПРО,” АПОКАЛИПСИС 2000, [22.06/1998].
[21] See “Залпы резервного фронта,” ajalehes Московсие Новости, (#25, 23.-30.06.1996).
[22] See http://www.diplomat.ru/interlife/ISSUES/1097/2.htm – [December 9, 1997]
[23] See Красная звезда, 19.11. 1993
[24] See [24] Vt. В.Цепляев, «Путин скорее Наполеон, чем де Голь», newspaper Аргументы и факты, (nr.19, 10.05,2000), p.2.