Introduction
The following article looks at Estonia’s foreign policy in Central Asia in the last two decades, up to m2014. Using the possibilities of foreign policy activities of Estonia as a small country in the system of modern international relations – from one side and; and Central Asia as a possible, potential cooperation area – from the other side will be examined in terms of internal and external factors. The author analyzes Estonia’s activities in Central Asia, outlines their strengths and weaknesses, as well as opportunities and risks in the post-Soviet period.
‘Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?’
‘That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,’ said the Cat.
‘I don’t much care where—’ said Alice.
‘Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,’ said the Cat.
‘—so long as I get somewhere,’ Alice added as an explanation.
Alice in Wonderland (Lewis Carroll)
Since 1991 and by now, a member of the European Union (EU) and NATO, Estonia continues to face the challenges and contradictions of the 21st century. The bigger goals and perspectives of foreign policy that have been tried for almost fifteen years have been basically achieved by 2004. Membership of two major international associations means that Estonia has a clear political, economic and strategic position on the world map, but at the same time a vague stage of individual foreign policy intellectual and financial viewpoints (or even lack of vision) and accordingly little activities phase has emerged. More and more has Estonia relied on the basic comprehension of the world events and generalized processes on the outside institutions.
Since the end of the Cold War (post-ideological world politics?) there has not been a definite dominant and all-encompassing, explanation of world arrangement changes but three main schools of international relations (IR) (realism, liberalism and constructivism, some of their with neo-versions). It may also be said (according to a different approach) that there has been only one theoretical school and that would define what was/is happening in the real world. This analysis could be either a theoretical (Arend Lijphart) or a configurative ideographic example (Harry Eckstein)[1] or rather a priori as a combination of two classical theoretical schools of international relations – profit-based (neo) realistic pragmatism and value-based (neo) idealistic (liberal) institutionalism.
The article-analysis here is a case study, which is rather the exercise of logically given theories (more biased to realism and pragmatism); and instead of proving or testing the reliability of one or another theory with one country’s foreign policy or to develop a new theory, the current survey, the theory part remains for the author as a tool of unpretentious reuse. The general methodological approach is based on layers, starting from general IR affairs and coming closer to the country under examination – Estonia, its level and quality of activities in Central Asia.
Thus, the following case-by-case approach (Central Asia and Estonia) is essentially a multi-dimensional analysis. First, the 21st century world, or the international environment in which Estonia should fit in, is considered as the starting point. Secondly, Estonia’s foreign and security policy in brief will be presented. Third, Central Asia, as a region and countries taken separately are analyzed; and then followed by a fourth focus point – Estonia’s promising and at the same time somewhat doubtful business diplomacy. Some facts of the reality of Estonia’s cooperation with the Central Asian states will end the analytical part.
International Politics by the Beginning of 2014
Not going into the details of IR, World Politics, Global Politics, World Affairs etc, it has to be notices, however, that globalization has become a common turnaround point in this big game of chess. Though the term is based on large and complex concepts, which in turn are based on cross-border technical-technological, economic, political and other processes, regardless of the order of the above-mentioned changes, we still have to face it whether we want it or not. Often these economic, IT and other process are simultaneous and combined in one or another way. In this transformed international policy, new perspectives for development are actually sought everywhere, despite the different major crises and crashes – terrorism and its fight; financial crisis and finding solutions. In a wider world, issues related to empirical data are consistently addressed and presented as to whether the world is uni and/or multipolar and which form could best fit into new security guarantees for countries, regions and the world; which single (supreme) state dominates; the economic, the military world leader; what role do international unions, institutions and organizations play in nation-state peace-building, at a time when international law presents contradictory challenges, on the one hand affirming national territorial unity and non-interventional policies (neo-realism), on the other hand respecting the fundamental rights and values (neo-idealism)? In this paradoxical world, nations and states, international associations and organizations are sometimes self-conflicting. From the security point of view, the fact is that more and more countries are questing for their actual nuclear programs (as the theoretical knowledge is available), which could be destructive to the world in terms of mass destruction.
Security in the modern world is of primary importance, regardless of whether we look at it historically in a narrower, military sense or in the context of the expanded version of the comprehension since 1990s, which included individual man and humanity at large as being surrounded by the environment (nature, social, political, economic), an international background of specific interactions – that means all areas of activity of a man, state, international institution from day to day activities to military operations in outer space.
However, without going to the level of controversial debate on the concept of security, it is worth noting that the foreign policy of small states (if our position coincides with the (neo) realist state-centered world of conflict and force/influence-theory of politics) is first and foremost an existential or survival policy, and that fact overlaps with security. It also means that the official documents of the “X-Country Foreign and Security Policy”, which are widespread in the world, are essentially a security policy, not narrowly military or excessively broad in the rest of life. Foreign policy gives the precise meaning of security to specific countries in specific strategies.
Foreign and security policy in itself applies only to the existence of states and national associations, which in turn constitute an international system. There are many ways to analyze Estonia and its foreign (and security) policies. In one case, we look at the system and define its components and fix both quantitatively and qualitatively the relationships between the components or the sequence of interactions. On the other hand, by analyzing the state level, we are in the analysis of foreign policy. In reality, these two levels need to be reconciled, which is relatively difficult to do and often it is not clear which (international system or country) is of primary goal and why. Hypothetically, one could argue that the world, the international system as a larger system weighs more and therefore, as a factor, it determines the behavior of smaller compartments (states). But it all depends on the size and influence of the country (a complex indicator of the country’s territory, population, economic success and political stability, lack of conflict both nationally and regionally, wider internationally). Larger and more economically-politically and militarily successful countries have extensive advantages over small ones. At the same time, small countries make up the majority of the world.
Secondly, one has to admit that one or the other historical world order is itself dependent on the same countries, either larger or smaller, or the combined activities of the larger ones. And here comes the importance of the countries’ foreign policy perspective, strategies.
Thirdly, the biggest opportunity-output of small countries lies in the activity of international associations, institution and groups (organizations). Here too big and small are involved, and larger ones can push their will to smaller ones, but not always. Skilful cooperation between smaller countries, as appropriate, can provide greater competition to the larger democratic voting model in international organizations.
Estonia’s Foreign Policy Choices by 2014
Estonia is undoubtedly a small country. Estonian foreign policy coincides also, as mentioned above, with its security policy. It does not make any difference, whether it is internal or external security because in the new, direct and indirect border-shrinking world, there is still a single, at times existential, security. The only question is where are the threats and risks of security, and for whom (as the referent object) we seek security, how we define it at all and with whom or through whom we guarantee this security.
The examination of Estonia’s foreign policy strategy and tactics is a priority for the executive branch – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – on the basis of instrumental power logic in function democracy. Depending on the need, employees of the Ministry of Defense and other ministries and agencies will be involved, the President and, to some extent, different committees of the Estonian Parliament (Riigikogu, see further RK) may participate as a group or the parliamentarians individually but neither committees nor their members are national foreign policy planners, normative implementers, but rather post factum co-contributors. The main instrument and output of the RK is parliamentary diplomacy, which in general is in line with the official foreign policy principles applied by the leading executive branch.
In Estonia’s foreign policy base documents, such as “Security Security and Indivisibility, Stability and Predictability of International Relations”, national (state) security is mentioned as the first point, and the keywords “EU”, “NATO”, “regional cooperation”, “new security threats” (terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, cybercrime) have important expression. This is followed by Estonia’s economic-trade relations, by consular relations, by international protection of Estonian citizens; and lastly, the document focuses on the value-based foreign policy – the promotion of democratic principles and development cooperation along the same line.[2]
A more specific security document, “The Basics of Estonian Security Policy” (2010), includes besides many aspects of security also an ecological perspective, as well as territoriality and the development of information and communication technologies as a potential source of conflict (e.g. the spread of distorted information).[3] Included are energy security, environmental security, classical internal security, or security with its specific areas, and the potential threats of terrorism and cyber attacks that have already become “commonplace”.[4] The models of cross-Atlantic cooperation and within the European Union, prioritizing development cooperation, democratic values are endlessly repeated. Finally, the document lacks any definition of security as such, after which the risks, threats and according counter actions are speciously defined.
All in all – three principles have formed the foundation of Estonia’s foreign policy: the state (existential aspect), the region (democratic values and cooperation) and the world (democratic values and their expansion in the world, development cooperation). This means that Estonia, as a country, has restored its historical connection regionally and on the basis of values in Europe, integrated into the European Union and NATO. The regional co-factors that have played a role in Estonia’s foreign policy were definitely the Baltic neighbors and the Nordic countries. With a special emphasis on foreign policy, Russia has been directly or indirectly registered as a threat, although it has not seen always as a direct danger of military assault, but in the confused international environment of the modern world energy [security], other implicit influences (Russia’s Eurasian ideas and their modern developments) have too been considered sometimes as the new threats.
Formally, but also in essence, Estonia and Russia are geopolitically in the position where a small country is located next to the large country with a huge military component and at the same time being economically unstable. Both countries (but related to different stages of history) are characterized by negative historical memory and general skepticism towards each other and the surrounding world in a wider perspective. All foreign policy directions have been closely interrelated (positive values and negative relationships): the state’s existence is largely based on a lack of confidence in the Soviet Union, post-Soviet, modern Russia, and broader cooperation within the European Union and regionally or bilaterally within the Union framework of NATO. In addition to the above, Estonia has a special relationship with the United States.
The above mentioned Estonian documents show that two decades after the restoration of independence, Estonia’s foreign (security) policy is at a standstill, there is no dynamism and prospect. While the world is expanding and there are gradually emerging new powerful international economic-political players from outside the Euro-Atlantic area (such as China, India, Brazil, etc.), Estonia itself provides the world with bilateral development cooperation with a small number of countries[5], justifying the selection principles on the one hand with the needs and priorities of developing countries, and on the other hand – with little resources in Estonia[6]. If the last explanation can be logically accepted, then the first principle would concern many countries, and the distinction between them, the four specific priority development cooperation countries – Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Afghanistan – the basic idea of choice, remains unclear, especially as the real developments in Afghanistan are relatively vague.
At the same time, the Estonian foreign policy document is surprisingly named “Security Security and Indivisibility, Stability and Predictability[7] of International Relations”. The hypothetical-optimistic development scenario for Afghanistan would indeed appear to be a prophecy depending on the meaning that we give to the word on the scale of predictability and unpredictability. In addition, Estonia has an aspiring, fragmentary model of development cooperation that lacks logical reasoning and a sustainable perspective in the political and economic geography.
Estonia’s bilateral relations with distant (non-European and transatlantic) countries exist but are relatively hectic in nature, also in the Central Asia region, which is considered an empirical object of this article.
Internal Factors of Dissimilarity and Attempts of Cooperation in Central Asia
While the Soviet Union existed, the term “Kazakhstan and the Republics of Central Asia” was used, which presented primarily reflection of an economic-regionalism[8], but in isolation both Kazakhstan and the other four structural units (republics) of the Soviet Union were in the status of fifteen other Soviet Republics. The nation-states in this ethnically conflicting region did not develop on the basis of self-determination of nations in history but national borders were pulled out by the Bolsheviks outside the region in the 1920s.[9] The term ” Kazakhstan and Central Asia” can be found in different political, economic and international analyzes of modern Russia.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, after the Cold War, in international politics, the question ioften is – what presents the “center” of Asia? What is still the center of Asia in a wider context or is it the only the Central Asia (of former USSR)? There are three classical interpretations of the answer, the narrower and the two broader definitions. In a smaller version, there are usually five former Soviet republics (now independent states), and in a broader sense, Mongolia, West China, Tibet, Kashmir, Afghanistan, part of Pakistan, Iran, etc.[10] are added to the Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Alternatively, Central Eurasia is also used, with Afghanistan being at the center, but often supplemented with the traditional Central Asia five and the previous (extended) versions of countries or regions.[11]
This article looks at Central Asia in a narrower sense, that is as the five former Soviet republics, the so-called Stan-counties – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Central Asia, although the Eurasian aspect has not been left out. Four out of the five countries considered here bear the official name of the Republic, Turkmenistan being just one word.
Geopolitically, this is a unique area that, on the one hand, borders with the territory of the world’s largest country – Russia and, on the other – the world’s largest nation by population – China. The largest Central Asian country – Kazakhstan itself is among the ten biggest (according to various indicators) in the world. In the South, the neighborhood is politically, militarily unstable, economically weak – Afghanistan, a controversial Iran. The geopolitical external aspects of the region exacerbate the internal problems and economic potential of the Central Asian countries.
Countries and people are different, the region in general is characterized by a number of threats and risks that create uncertainty in international relations with countries in the region: high unemployment (young people), corruption, low level democracy and questionable human rights issues, as well as the proximity to Afghanistan and the consequent proliferation of military activities. Across the borders to Central Asia, organized crime (drugs), ethnic cross-border conflicts, possible irredentism, segregation, the spread of Islamic extremism, the conflicting ambitions of Russia and China, and so on – characterize it all.
Oil and natural gas reserves and other natural resources are important in Central Asia in terms of positive analysis of the region. Above all, it concerns three countries – Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The other two – Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are relatively mineral-poor, compared to the three “rich”, but geographically they are mountainous and the (river) waters there are used to produce electricity. China has been a major investor in the construction of new hydroelectric power plants in recent decades.[12] Electricity is also exported to Afghanistan.
It should also be mentioned that the existence of mineral resources is only the basis for interest in the region. Geographically (but also geopolitically) Central Asia is actually inland, far from the three economic centers of the world – North America, Europe and East/Southeast Asia. The North American energy market is not interested in the Central Asian countries, and vice versa. North America has no greater strategy in this area. For example, in the United States, there are enough energy resources themselves, and oil and gas from the nearest neighborhood are also imported.[13] However, Central Asia is attractive to Europe (to avoid direct dependence on monopoly by Russia, at least as a gas exporter), China, South Korea and Japan, as well as south – India and other countries. To avoid isolation, good relations with neighbors in the region are important for Central Asia, because through someone (in transit) or somewhere (as a destination country) you have to transport your oil, gas, electricity and other goods, if any. Looking at the region as a whole, Russia, China and Afghanistan are the biggest direct cross-border neighbors. Russia and China themselves are interested in their participation in the economic and political activities of the region. Afghanistan is a more targeted country. Based on the war in Afghanistan, the United States has been associated with Central Asian countries for about a decade.
The countries of Central Asia are countries with different levels of economic development.[14] For 20 years, poverty and other major social problems (unemployment, access to medicine, the spread of AIDS, etc.) have dominated in several countries. It is often a mono-economy (oil, gas, cotton, wheat) and so-called “tolerant” corruption countries’ case. Compared to the modernization of the global economy, the countries of Central Asia are left far behind.
The five countries of Central Asia are ethnically-politically diverse and have created transnational political conflict situations, which in turn have affected economic relations and developments. For example, the ethnic conflict between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan has led to a crisis in Kyrgyzstan in the economic sphere, where specifically the state’s possible rail freight transit through Uzbekistan’s Soviet-era infrastructure has been blocked longer and Kyrgyzstan is looking for new ways to realize its exports (gold, agricultural goods). The differences between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan led to the end of Uzbekistan’s spring 2012 gas supply.
The region with its peculiar countries (politically, socio-economically, ethnically) is a geographical entity only from the outside. In essence, it consists of local, separate (sometimes conflicting) political systems and markets with specific legal arrangements and local traditions. In addition, entry into these markets (investing or exporting/importing) takes place through different transit countries and corridors and, overall, makes communication with Central Asia even more risky. Finally, Central Asia’s biggest threats and risks are one-sided economic production, differences within countries (lack of co-operation), distance from global economic centers, and questioning of training corridors.
Foreign Factors that Influence Central Asia
By putting economic interests first in this analysis, the problem of transit corridors, transit countries is emerging. Russia is among the countries in Central Asia, which is primarily interested in its presence in the region and its political (less even economic) influence on the resources and goods passing through its territory, through which to gain additional leverage to influence the various ends of transit: both starting points and destination countries.
In recent years, Russia has authorized military air transit to various countries (Germany, France, USA and Italy[15]) towards Afghanistan, due to the threat of drug trafficking and terrorism. NATO’s early 2012 negotiations with Russia on establishing a communication line on issues of multimodal military transit from Afghanistan (air and rail transport) are also related to Estonia, as the planned stop on the way to Western Europe is planned in addition to Russia initially to Riga or Tallinn.[16]
In other cases (economic, commercial), Russia is mainly a land transit country, an infrastructure of highways and railways that are little modernized and criminally dangerous since Soviet times. In addition, Russia is characterized by legal confusion, high bureaucracy and corruption.
The transportation of Central Asia’s energy resources through Russia also means “pipeline-diplomacy”, which yet again uses Soviet and Russian technology and thus, Russia could theoretically monopolize the region. As an argument, existing pipeline connections are presented and, as a near future scenario, extensive co-operation in the Eurasian Community, the Union («Союз») would take place.
The Eurasia project was originally planned to launch a single customs and then an economic space on the territory of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, considering the increasing role of the economy in the world. Some analysts find that the Eurasian project is a logical continuation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS or CIS-1) (“CIS-2”), a new stage of development, a renewed system of communication and cooperation.[17] From the point of view of other analysts, the new Union in the process of establishment must replace the outdated CIS, which has failed to meet its objectives – indirect restoration of the Soviet Union in the political, economic and military spheres.[18] There is localization, competition and conflict between the CIS countries. The new project should increase trust between the participating countries and also lead, through the economy, to greater political and military cooperation in international relations, meaning that it will expand its relative single economic space from the original customs cooperation and later add new (economic) aspects to other areas of activity and economic cooperation will dictate. Thus, from the point of view of Vladimir Putin, his third (and perhaps fourth) term is not the Russian Federation, but the President of Eurasia.[19] The world reaction to the release of Putin- Russia’s global project in 2011 was modest, but also rhetorical: the new plan is not comparable to the European Union (Germany), the new Stalin is coming (Italy), and Brezhnev’s pictures on the streets (Slovakia) can be expected.[20]
The beginnings and development of Eurasian ideas in Russia and Kazakhstan and the promotion of a new Eurasian Union, the creation of a single customs regime involving Russia (the initiator), Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and the Kyrgyzstan currently involved, the latter who has no borders with Russia as the only countries mentioned, have misunderstood politicians and analysts. Certain explanations give Kyrgyzstan its geopolitical position (a long border with China) and the existence of military bases of two countries – the United States and Russia. If the United States’ interests may seem temporary from Kyrgyzstan perspective (military action in Afghanistan will probably never end), Russia’s interests will be more permanent and, logically, Russia will be an ally of Kyrgyzstan.[21] As far as China is concerned, Kyrgyzstan has expressed a certain pessimistic attitude: firstly, China is a country to be afraid (ultimately, it may subordinate the country to its power, Russia is further afield), and secondly – China has also used its (China) workforce, which Kyrgyzstan has strongly criticized, for Kyrgyzstan’s investment.[22]
Skeptically and with some fear, the new Eurasian Union project is approached by the gas-rich Azerbaijan from the South Caucasus and Turkmenistan from Central Asia because, from their point of view, the Eurasian Union is Russia’s influential project that geopolitically lies between Europe and China.[23]
Russia – is in interested in quick actions in the Central Asia as on the one hand, as there is a fear the fear of China’s growing economic influence and from the other side – the European Union still existing distant ideas upon coming (re-entering) the region.
Estonian activities in Central Asia
From the point of view of the Republic of Estonia, in some respects, direct neighbors – Russia and China – are more important than Central Asia as a whole; Russia, historical and modern, but also in the future. China is (could be) an important partner for Estonia in terms of its more rapid economic growth and international political influence in various international institutions and as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
The Republic of Estonia has established a great time gap in establishing diplomatic relations between the countries of Estonia and Central Asia. For example, diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan were concluded in 1992, but with Tajikistan only in 2006.[24] The other three countries remain in the period 1992-2006.
Traditionally (albeit not always) the diplomatic relations establishments were followed by double tax avoidance agreements – (Income and Capital Tax) – double tax avoidance and tax avoidance agreements. In 2012, such an agreement applies only to Kazakhstan, although negotiations have been held and signed with other countries in the region – Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan.
Why should Estonia be interested in Central Asia at all and vice versa – why would the Central Asian countries be interested in Estonia? Estonia’s interest in Central Asian countries would be pragmatic (based on economic interests), as well as indirectly the establishment of democratic values and human rights, so the Baltic Sea region, the European Union, NATO could co-act.
Central Asia as a region would possibly assist Estonia e.g. to be a transit region for economic and commercial relations with China, which undoubtedly belongs to Estonia’s foreign policy priorities as one of the fastest economically successful countries. On the basis of terrestrial transit, Estonia has a long way to reach Central Asia, that is a direct territorial distance and, in the meaning transferred, various political-bureaucratic barriers initiated by Russia. Here we are again – Russia as a “mediating” factor in the logistics of economic cooperation with the Central Asian countries.
Estonian-Central Asia private sector comprehensive study is not part of this analysis framework, as the overview data is inadequate and the article is primarily a state (or the states’) analysis. Certainly the state must provide the private sector with the best opportunities to operate in one or another region of the world, as far as possible, even when providing the necessary information or initiating bilateral and multilateral relations. For example, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Estonia has done an annual foreign visit to the region under review: in 2009 to Kazakhstan, in 2010 – to Kyrgyzstan and in autumn 2011 to Turkmenistan. During his last visit, the Estonian Prime Minister offered Turkmenistan continued oil transit and transit (via Russia) in the Baltic Sea region.[25] An important aspect of transnational communication, as well as the development of economic-trade partnership, is certainly the simplification of the visa regime, which has been the subject of various national meetings.
Estonian diplomacy is oriented towards a new direction – business diplomacy, which is already being launched: “Today, Estonia’s representation network is closely related to the interests of our companies. The last open embassy in Kazakhstan, Consulate General in Shanghai, and the embassy in India to be opened this year are heavily involved in our desire to intensify business relations,”[26] said the Estonian Foreign Minister, referring optimistically to the” ingenuity”[27] of the recent Indonesian visit (January 2012), where representatives of the Estonian and Finnish public and business sectors investigated. After the visits by the two foreign ministers, it was stated: “It was our first joint visit with business delegations, which is probably also unique in the wider international context … Synergy emerged that enabled the strengths of both sides. Together we look bigger than walking one by one … Finland and Estonia are both small countries; together we are more attractive”.[28]
The development co-operation with Central Asian countries is discussed below. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the co-operation of the Estonian state (financing of different projects) with five countries has been relatively modest over the last ten years. Most projects with the countries in the region have ended. For example, there is currently no cooperation project with Turkmenistan. In 2007, the only project with this country in the last decade was the integration of humanitarian and social scientists with the cost of the European Union Research Area about six thousand Euros.[29] Limited cooperation can be explained by the neutrality-policy of the Turkmen state, that is carrying out the great isolation, closed by the state for internal political stability and foreign economic attractiveness.[30]
Co-operation projects between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are mainly support for environmental NGOs, training and co-operation of national civil servants and a large part of OSCE election observation and small IT co-operation.[31] Practically all the projects are over.
All projects have ended with Uzbekistan. Areas related to this country over the past decade – mainly support for (through) international organizations, such as the financing of the World Health Organization WHO Conference 2008, support for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) (albeit with Uzbekistan) 2010, World Trade Organization (WTO) seminars – training courses (2001, 2004).[32]
With Tajikistan, Estonia has previously been engaged in IT sphere (2002) and attempted to increase public sector capability (2007), supported OSCE PA observers and finally trained one Master’s student (2011).[33]
On the basis of data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it appears that the largest amount of cooperation has been allocated to Uzbekistan (about 128,000 Euros) and the smallest to Turkmenistan – 6,647 Euros.[34] It should also be noted that the above-mentioned areas are the largest in the analysis, but to a lesser extent other specialists in other fields have been implemented. Overall, it has been funded by the state (through ministries and agencies) and NGOs; compared to the state – in a perceptible minority. The promising IT sector as a separately serious development cooperation perspective in Central Asia over the last decade is not been reflected. Perhaps the political, economic and social environment needs first and foremost have been prioritized together with the development and real democratization of various areas of activities. For Estonia as a small country, the economic contribution to politically unpredictable (aging authoritarian leaders) in Central Asian stan-countries is a risky game, plus it means “involvement” into Russia’s visions in the region. It would be logical for Estonia to start with the development of pragmatic relations with the biggest and economically most successful country – Kazakhstan.
Summary
Estonian foreign policy in general has no specific long-term geopolitical permanent interests and goals besides those of the EU and NATO. The four priority countries outlined in the framework of development cooperation (Afghanistan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) express the momentum that does not preclude their change in the near future.
The Central Asian region, within the meaning of the five former Soviet republics, is not one of the current priorities of the development cooperation of the Republic of Estonia, not a single country. The extended Central Asian version would include a group of countries with Afghanistan whose future model does not allow a clear predictability scenario.
At the same time, the political and economic relations between the five countries of Central Asia are complex, contradictory, and sometimes conflicting, creating poor conditions for the rest of the world to communicate with the rich areas of mineral resources. The region is also hampered by the clashes between the special interests of two major neighboring countries, Russia and China, in the region.
For Estonia, the countries of Central Asia are distant and business transit diplomacy and direct economic and trade relations must take into account the transit area between Russia. In such a situation, Russia becomes a simple neighbor state for Estonia as an international actor on pragmatic basis.
Every country, and especially a small country, must find internationally viable international cooperation partners in the world and, on the basis of its few material and human resources, pursue the objectives of effective and flexible foreign policy, diplomacy. Estonian foreign policy towards the Central Asian (former Soviet republics) countries is trying to get somehow and somewhere as put by Lewis Carroll.
Notes
[1] See: Daniel Nortedt, „Managing Crisis Abroad: the Brolin Kidnapping“, The Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning, 2000, Vol.7., http://www.fhs.se/Documents/Externwebben/forskning/centrumbildningar/Crismart/Publikationer/Publikationsserier/VOLUME_7.PDF (20.02.2014)
[2] See Estonian Foreign Ministry, „Eesti välispoliitika eesmärgid ja alameesmärgid“, http://www.vm.ee/?q=node/4476 (20.03.2012).
[3] See Estonian Foreign Ministry, „Eesti julgeolekupoliitika alused“, 2010, http://www.vm.ee/sites/default/files/JPA_2010.pdf (15.03.2012)
[4] See Estonian Foreign Ministry, „Eesti julgeolekupoliitika alused“, 2010, http://www.vm.ee/sites/default/files/JPA_2010.pdf (15.03.2012)
[5] See Estonian Foreign Ministry, Prioritized (but not the only ones) partners – Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Afghanistan, http://www.vm.ee/?q=et/node/8630#projpartner (20.03.2012)
[6] See Estonian Foreign Ministry, http://www.vm.ee/?q=et/node/8630#projpartner (20.03.2012)
[7] Highlighted by the author
[8] Фергана News, «Большая Центральная Азия»: Геополитический проект или внешнеполитический инструмент?, 04.04.2008, http://www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=5655 (10.02.2014)
[9] Mustafa Aydin. Geopolitics of Central Asia and the North Caucasus; Continuity and Change Sinced the End of the Cold War, in „Turkish Yearbook 2001“, http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/44/672/8560.pdf (15.03.2014)
[10] Фергана News, «Большая Центральная Азия»:
Геополитический проект или внешнеполитический инструмент?, 04.04.2008, http://www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=5655 (10.02.2012)
[11] S.Frederick Starr. In Defense of Greater Central Asia. Policy Paper, September 2008, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/0809GCA.pdf (15.02.2012)
[12] „Strategy for Regional Cooperation in the Energy Sector of CAREC Ccountries“, 2008, http://www.carecprogram.org/uploads/docs/CAREC-Regional-Cooperation-Strategy-in-Energy.pdf (10.03.2012)
[13] US Department of Energy, “How much petroleum does the United States import?”, 2011, http://205.254.135.7/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=36&t=6 (10.03.2012); US Department of Energy, „US Natural Gas Imports by Country“
[14] See country Comparisons: GDP per capita (est.) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html (10.03.2014)
[15] See for example – „Соглашение между Правительством Российской Федерации и Правительством Итальянской Республики о транзите воздушным транспортом вооружения, боеприпасов, военной техники, военного имущества и персонала через территорию Российской Федерации…“ (2011), http://www.conventions.ru/view_base.php?id=1127 (10.03.2014)
[16] See also „Американцы уйдут из Афганистана через Ульяновск“, Газета “Коммерсантъ”, №19 (4804), 03.02.2012, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc-y/1864350 (11.02.2014)
[17] See «Новый интеграционный проект для Евразии — будущее, которое рождается сегодня», «Известия», 3.10.2011 (25.03.2012)
[18] Юрий Коргунюк. Покойник жив. Gazeta.ru, 29.12.2011, http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2011/12/29_a_3951765.shtml (25.03.2014)
[19] See «Пресса России: Путин – президент Евразии?», BBC (3.10.2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2011/10/111005_rus_press.shtml (26.03.2014)
[20] See «Евразия Путина. Глобальная реакция», Новости Украины, http://www.from-ua.com/politics/47c91355ed6a9.html , (26.03.2014)
[21] Michael Schwirtz, „Kyrgyzstan Votes for a President, Feeling the Pull of Russia“, New York Times, 29.10.2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/world/asia/as-kyrgyzstan-votes-some-consider-a-turn-to-russia.html?_r=2&hp (19.03.2012)
[22] Michael Schwirtz, „Kyrgyzstan Votes for a President, Feeling the Pull of Russia“, New York Times, 29.10.2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/world/asia/as-kyrgyzstan-votes-some-consider-a-turn-to-russia.html?_r=2&hp (19.03.2012)
[23] Robert Coalson, Putin’s Return to Kremlin Could Boost Eurasian Union Project, Voice of America, Europe, 09.03. 2012, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/europe/Putins-Return-to-Kremlin-Could-Reenergize-Eurasian-Union-Project-142051333.html (25.03.2014)
[24] See the establishment of bilateral relations between Estonia and the Central Asian states http://www.vm.ee/sites/default/files/dip%20suhted_alates_1991_0.pdf (20.03.2012)
[25] See Новости Туркменистана, Центральная Азия, «Эстония предлагает Туркмении свои услуги по нефтетранзиту», 30.11.2011, http://www.easttime.ru/news/1/2/3526.html (30.03.2012)
[26] Estonian Foreign Ministry, Foreign Minister Urmas Paet in Tallinn, 09.03.2012, http://www.vm.ee/?q=node/13924 (30.03.2012)
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Estonian Foreign Ministry, Development Cooperation, https://rakendused.vm.ee/akta/andmed_vaata.php?id=826 (15.03.2014)
[30] Luca Anceschi. „Turkmenistan’s Foreign Policy: Positive Neutrality and the Consolidation of the Turkmen Regime“, Routledge, 2009, pp.63-96.
[31] Estonian Foreign Ministry, Development Cooperation, https://rakendused.vm.ee/akta/andmed.php# , (15.03.2014)
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.