“Baltic Perspectives on Regional Security Challenges”

  1. Security and regional security – clarifications, definitions.

Introduction

After the WWII the 1st Secretary General of the United Nations said that people rather prepare for the conflicts than for co-operation. That was followed by the Cold war and realism in international relations. The post Cold war years in 1990s  expressed more clearly idealism and cooperation implications that were caused by several international tendencies (factors) to be taken into account:

  • the disappearance of the bilateral world order and balance of power;
  • worldwide globalization and regionalization process;
  • widening of the threat of use of weapons of mass destructions as a result of extending of the number of states owning these weapons and threat of possession of them by the terrorist groups (especially after the breakup of the USSR)
  1. Security and regional security – clarifications, definitions.

It is a well-known wisdom – based on historical experience of mankind – that people rather prepare for conflicts than for co-operation. However, the 20th century has put mankind before a choice – to work together or destroy itself through the use of weapons of mass destruction. The Cold war period characterized through realist balance of power avoided violent clashes with such advanced weapon systems. The post-Cold war years, specifically the 1990s represented a transitory period in global affairs as well as in regional and national politics, including security. The traditional, narrow definition of security (that is material capabilities, the use and control of military force) was gradually replaced by broader concepts of security studies that included state and non-state actors with the acknowledgment of new security threats in world politics.

In fact, ‘security’ became a popular term and politicians, journalists, academics spoke and wrote of common security, collective security, comprehensive security, soft and hard security, human and societal security, national, regional and international security. Sometimes these notions overlapped, sometimes they had their specific meaning.

At the end of the 19th century the term security had slightly negative shades. Although people thought about peace they nevertheless were practically engaged in formulating warfare rules. By the end of the 20th century people are engaged in creating peacemaking rules for which purpose regional security is meant for.

 Regional security.

In reality regional security is geographically closely located states’ security. In history the regional security has been most strong in Europe. Regional security is theoretically based on the idea of amity-enmity. Friendly relations reach from good-neighboring relations to support of something. Hostility is expressed in fear and suspicions. In between of amity-enmity is the sphere of neutrality which is, however, a rather doubtful concept nowadays.

Estonian security policy basics in 1990s: from defense to security without classical enemies.

Estonian security policy of 1990s can be called as transitory one carried out between contradictions of the past and future, the East and West, sovereignty and integration.

At the beginning of 1990s, right after the collapse of the USSR and re-establishment of independence, Estonia’s security policy coincided with defense one. As a small country it followed two options: first, to build its own defense forces while the ex-Soviet (Russian) troops were still located on the territory of Estonia and second, to integrate into the international organizations. Estonia made gradually its way into the world by starting from application and membership in some international institutions like the United Nations (in September 1991), the CSCE/OSCE (1991); the Council of Europe; the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), where they were among the founding members in 1992, the NACC (1991) and the Western European Union (WEU) (as the associated members in 1994).

By 1994 Estonia had a clear vision of its foreign and security policy that was expressed in the formula where foreign policy was equalized to security. Security itself had a double meaning – from one side it was the western integration and from the other side – the eastern engagement. As for the Western integration Estonia turned its attention to two international institutions which membership they lacked but which could serve as security means, namely – NATO and EU with the aim to avoid formation of so-called gray or buffer zone between Russia and the (w)rest of Europe. In the Eastern engagement Estonian foreign policy anticipated the improvement of relations with Russia and other former Soviet republics.

Baltic cooperation.

Regional cooperation took place already in 1930s after signing the Treaty of Good Understanding and Co-operation. In the post-Soviet years a network of Baltic states cooperation has been settled. Thus, the Baltic Assembly (cooperation between the parliamentarians) was established in 1991; Baltic Council of Ministers (heads of governments; a number of committees) in 1994; the Baltic Council (brings together the Baltic Assembly and Baltic Council); meetings of the Presidents.

The most intensive and successful cooperation has taken place in the military sphere, the real partnership within the framework of defense cooperation. Here the three Baltic States have joint projects, training, procurement and exercises. The more successful spheres included the Baltic Navy Squadron (BALTRON with the main task of countering mine threats, participating in international peace support operations etc.); the Baltic Airspace Surveillance Network (BALTNET defensive radar network in the region); the joint peace-keeping unit BALTBAT (created in 1994 to operate under the auspices of international organisations); the joint defense college (BALTDEFCOL, established in Tartu, Estonia in 1999); the joint Navy education center in Liepāja and the Swedish-Baltic joint project to modernize the military registration system and mobilization database (BALTPERS). In addition, a joint BALTSEA project between Baltic, Nordic, and other partner countries was launched. It was aimed at coordinating defense and security assistance to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

On January 16, 1998 three Baltic presidents and the US president signed the US – Baltic Charter according to which security and economic working groups were arranged.

Although there are formally numerous Baltic cooperation institutions, it has also been a clear-cut rivalry between the three countries on bilateral level (e.g. Lithuania and Latvia in the delimitation of sea border) or between Estonia Latvia (the island and fishery problems) in 1990s. In addition, the three have been competing for the first membership status in EU and NATO. Since 1995 Estonia and then Latvia turned towards the North while Lithuania turned to the South – Poland and Central Europe.

The Baltic – Nordic cooperation.

The Baltic Nordic cooperation is taking place according to another formula which is called five plus three (“5+3) between the Nordic (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) and Baltic (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) countries. There are regular meetings (mostly on European integration issues) between:

  • the Heads of the Governments
  • the Foreign Ministers
  • the Co-operation ministers
  • the Heads of the Political Departments of Foreign Ministries.

Meetings are also held in “5+3+n” format which might include for example Russian high officials, cabinet members.

The Baltic Sea area has been referred to as the most rapidly developing region in the European Union, but it has also been the most puzzling region from the point of view of the institutionalization of international politics, economy and cooperation. For instance, in the 1990s, in addition to Baltic institutions there also existed Scandinavian institutions as well as the Northern Dimension and CBSS. Some Scandinavian countries also belonged to the Barents Sea Council. The plurality of those institutions made it difficult to understand their aims and functions, and some of them were also rather bureaucratic.

Estonian defense system.

Estonian Defence Forces’ (EDF) aim is to be ready for prospective NATO membership through the improvement of defense capabilities in general and interoperability with the Alliance in particular. Introduction of long-term perspective and programme-based budgeting system are important features in the coming of age of the EDF.

During 2001 a conceptual basis for the further development of Estonian Defence Forces was laid. Security Concept and National Military Strategy were passed and an extensive review of EDF’s development up to year 2015 was carried out. The defense budget for fiscal year 2002 reached 2% of the GDP.

The force structure review accepted by the Government in November 2001 includes an assessment of the extent to which the proposed structure could support the essential tasks associated with Alliance membership – making a substantial contribution to national defense within an Alliance context and an effective and equitable contribution to the defense of other Allies.

According to the new structure the army will consist of an infantry brigade and a territorial defense structure consisting of seven battalions. Navy will enhance its mine countermeasures capabilities and develop mine laying capabilities. The review also identified the requirement to enhance Estonian rapid reaction capabilities. Estonia will develop two readiness battalions, will reinforce its air surveillance capabilities and will upgrade host nation support capabilities.

 Estonia and NATO.

From the very beginning of re-independence Estonia quested for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership. After the departure of Russian troops in 1994 Estonian governments have been actively engaged in pursuing the goal. The popular support to NATO has also been high in Estonia. It has been more favorable than the EU integration. Since 2001 the NATO support among Estonian citizens has been stable over 60 percent and in February 2003 67 per cent of the total population favored NATO membership (73% of Estonians and 39% of non-Estonians). As for the participation in NATO military operations then 45 % would reject (decline) the military activities and 50% would favor Estonian military participation in conflict resolutions. (58% of Estonian citizens and 31% of non-Estonian citizens).

 

Estonian contribution to the international security.

Estonia has participated in UN peacekeeping missions UNPROFOR/UNCRO (in former Yugoslavia under the Danish command) and UNIFIL (in Lebanon under Norwegian command). Estonia is participating in UNTSO (Middle-East) observation mission. In addition, Estonia has participated in NATO-led peacekeeping (?) operations (IFOR, SFOR, KFOR), West European Union’s police units (MAPE) and in OSCE missions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Georgia.

Estonia and Russia.

It is a long story to tell but for certain historical experiences, psychological, cultural and other reasons Russia has been one of the motives of Estonia’s rapid integration to the West. The relations between the two countries have developed upside down with (officially) mutual negative attitudes. Russia’s main concerns of the decade were alleged violation human rights of Russian speakers in Estonia, border problems etc. The very last years Russia was be concerned with the NATO enlargement to the Baltic states. The most recent worries of Russia were expressed by the Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov on NATO-Russia Joint Council (?) on May 13 over the delays of CFE ratification (and the repositioning of weaponry to the new members) by the new members. The basic document that was signed in 1990 before the collapse of the Communist system and it was modified at OSCE Istanbul summit in 1999. However, Russia has not fulfilled the new criteria of CFE (withdrawal of the troops from Moldova and Georgia) and therefore its final ratification (by whom?) has not taken place. At the same time Russia insists that the candidate countries should ratify it before May 2004 or otherwise, there could not be new NATO members.

Estonia is not member of CFE but considers it important and would define its relationship after the ratification of CFE (treaty or agreement?)

Disarmament and arms control.

Estnia has joined to all the important disarmament and treaties on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – NPT – Nuclear Proliferation Treaty; CTBT (CTBT), Chemical Weapons’ Convention; (CWC), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

In 1991 at Washington Summit the Membership Action Plan (MAP) was established. In September of last year, the Estonian government approved the third Annual National Programme (ANP): 2001/2002. This week, on the 8 of April, the Estonian Prime Minister, Mr. Siim Kallas and the Minister of Defence, Mr. Sven Mikser submitted a final report to the North Atlantic Council (NAC). This report received positive feedback. Of course, there are a few important areas that require further efforts and we will address them. (Ojuland 2002)

In my view, one of the most important results of defence cooperation with Denmark is the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL) in Tartu. Under the command of Danish Brigadier General Michael H. Clemmesen, the college educates officers who will ensure that the military and defence forces of the three Baltic states will be compatible with NATO forces by the next enlargement. All officers in this college are trained according to NATO standards and procedures. In June of this year, around Midsummer’s Day, the third Senior Staff Course and the first Colonel’s Course will graduate (Ojuland 2002)

The NATO Summit in Prague is the first historic summit scheduled to take place in the second half of this year. We know that decisions on enlargement will be based on performance and will be finalised in the autumn. Based on indications so far, however, a large enlargement looks more likely than ever.

While we are eager to secure an invitation, we recognise that our dialogue with NATO will not end at the Prague Summit. Prague will signal the start of a more extensive relationship with NATO. Our have troops have already participated in many NATO-led international peacekeeping operations, including the IFOR/SFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the KFOR mission in Kosovo (Ojuland, 2002)

In order to preserve and increase security and stability in the Baltic Sea region, we have cooperated closely with many NATO countries, including the UK. With the help of the Nordic countries, Germany, the UK, and the United States, we have built strong defensive ties with our Baltic neighbours. The ultimate aim of this on-going cooperation is to create NATO-compatible armed forces that are skilled, effective, and deployable in any given situation and region.

Last year, Estonia carried out a major structural review of its defence forces. In the process we defined and clarified our mid- and long-term development plans according to NATO standards. Our aim is to find a place within the NATO structure that corresponds to our needs, and makes full use of our intellectual, political, and military potential. We will continue with our efforts to make our forces fully inter-operable with NATO forces.

Estonia is one of the few countries in Europe where the national defence expenditure is 2% of the GDP. We are committed to maintaining this level in order to continue to improve our military capabilities (Ojuland, 2002)

In the national security policy sphere, it primarily means that we will be participating in joint crises regulation and prevention. No one is expecting a small nation like Estonia to contribute large military units, but within the scope of collective activities, even small states can participate with small but well trained and prepared forces. Plus, Estonia, as a country, which, during the last decade, has gone through a fast reform process, would be able to pass on non-military experiences (Ojuland, 2002 – detsember)