Estonian and Russian Foreign Policies in Comparison: Values, Society and the State.
Estonians and Russians – two adjacent nations, one big and another small, unlike in religion, language, customs and other characteristics, have, however, lived rather a long period together in the Russian empire and in the successive Soviet Union as an outcome of numerous occupations by the Russians and the Soviets.
Both nations had also experienced democratic statehood prior to the post-Cold war era: the Russians – eight months in between the February and October revolutions in 1917 until the Bolsheviks seized the power; the Estonians two decades – in 1920s and 1930s until the Soviets (Bolsheviks) in turn annexed and occupied their territories.
While the Russian democratic experience was almost near to zero (with anarchic elements), the Estonians however managed to build up a more or less democratic political system and relatively effective market economy. Estonian foreign policy of 1920s and 1930s concentrated on security search in the West through the League of Nations and various international pacts[1], which nevertheless ended up with the fiasco in 1940 and dissolution of the independent Estonian state as the result of named Soviet occupation. Fifty years later, in the post-Cold war Europe, the two nations try to settle their relatively complicated inter-state relations, which partly originate from history and partly from the current ambiguous international situation. Accordingly the explanations of those relations can be characterized either along the lines of déjà vu or sui generis reasoning.
The following article is aimed at covering the Estonian-Russian relations in the post-cold war period, to comprehend the basics of the Estonian and Russian foreign policies individually to understand the motives that stand behind the singular state acts and together to explain the reasons of the outcome of those relations. For that reason the foreign policy communities, elites, foreign and security policy concepts as well as authority patterns will be studied and compared. In the authority pattern my aim is to compare several institutions in Russia and in Estonia – the president, prime ministers and the cabinets, the foreign ministries as they all are, directly or indirectly, related to the foreign policy making in the respective countries. From both sides, the value levels, as well as institutional and behavioural ones are studied. Less attention is dedicated to the issues and topic-details as the main goal of the whole work is to find causal links between the values, authority pattern and the behaviour in the Estonian and Russian foreign policy making and in the resulting mutual relations.
The following assumption support the current analysis: first, state’s relations with the other state are influenced by the state’s relations with its own society, even if the society is, changing. Second, domestic foreign policy sources are derived from foreign policy community (mainly state elite) which are usually related to the society. Third, the inter-state conflict relations base on the wider value conflict in the respective societies.
In addition, it should be noted here that there is a vast scholarly literature on Russia, its foreign and security policies and far less analysis on the Baltic state of Estonia. At the same time, the usual Russian foreign policy analyses often present a “descriptive fact-gathering”[2] interpretation, versions of various data, figures of the election turnover, opinion polls’ results; that is a numerical-statistical proof to validate sometimes confused arguments and attempts to provide them in a logical order and in some academic set. Within the more comprehensive and extensive theoretical modelling the Russian foreign and security studies have been concentrating on the historical theories of déjà vu (concepts of historical legacy, imperialism[3], expansionism)[4], or on studies of contemporary Russia and its foreign and security policies. The most examined among the last are the theories of (neo)realism and concepts of geopolitics, national interest and security; but also the Hobbesian, Grotian and Kantian paradigms and their sophistications, which rather often end up with complex and Russia-distant philosophical patterns[5]. In this work both, the theoretical and factual (sometimes) exaggerations have been tried to avoid.
Unlike transition patterns in post-Soviet Estonia and Russia.
In 1990s Estonia and Russia were constantly arguing over several issues: the Russian military troops’ withdrawal, Russian-speakers in Estonia, border-line, the orthodox church registration in Estonia are the best known and most analysed of those[6]. The pro et contra arguments divided Estonia and Russia to some extent as differing countries with contradictory foreign policies. In fact the foreign policies (including the most visible part of it as respective concepts and daily diplomatic practices) based on the controversies of dominating value systems in both countries that originated from past and were (and still are) closely related to the histories in the 20th century. Estonia’s pre -WWII twenty years of relatively democratic existence influenced the formation of the Estonian generation with liberal democratic values, perception of democratic rights (including minority rights[7]), market economy principles. Since 1940s, the following Soviet totalitarian regime in Estonia, however, could not compete with the already established democratic (national) values and was not able to expire them. In turn, the Estonians had to adapt the Soviet way of life through the system of double values – one in public (the Soviet democratic values) and the other – private (the previous liberal democratic values), the circumstances that one may call hypocritical, however, necessary for their survival. The persistence of the Estonians’ democratic values was supported by several specific factors characteristic to the Estonians: the social memory of the first republic in 1920s and 1930s; the contact with the relatives abroad[8]; the Finnish tourism; the Finnish TV[9]. The Gorbachev’s perestroika was a start of a transformation from the dual value system to the modified and modernized liberal values for many Estonians. Right after the re-establishment of the independence in August 1991, Estonia’s self-identification was an easy task and, therefore, the foreign policy orientations did not raise questions among the Estonians. Most of the Estonian Russian-speakers, however, were confused and/but they did not belong to the government and the new parliament and did not take part in the decision-making process. The post-Soviet ethnic situation was reverse to this in the Soviet Estonia when most of the authority (party) leaders were just Russian-speakers although the basic decision-making took place not in Estonia but in Moscow. Nevertheless, Estonia made its Western democratic value orientation decision right after regaining independence in 1991 and followed this pattern all the years after.
Russian history lacked any longer periods of Western, liberal democratic periods and for that reason Gorbachev – period could not be named as a liberal or a Western one but perhaps simply oppositional to the CPSU if such a wider opposition exited at all. For Russia, the period of new values’ quest, self-identification and foreign policy options coincided with the years 1992-1993 which by many American and European foreign policy analysts was applied as the Russia’s Western-oriented foreign policy carried out by liberal foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev. These differences in value system transformations represented one of the major sources for foreign policy controversies between Estonia and Russia. Estonia did not just choose overall Western orientation but returned to the Western values, including those within the outline of the modernized and modified foreign policy setting (transformed déjà vu line). At the same time Russia turned to the totally unknown (historically unlike) domestic and international situation. While the initial domestic goal of market economy introduction was at least theoretically an easier task, the collapse of the international system (and the realist paradigm) of bipolar power-politics caused confusion in the world comprehension and chaos both to the theory and to the policies. The lack of democratic past and the change of international setting were one of the main reasons that caused Russia (unlike Estonia) to overstress the sui generis circumstances and select sometimes problematic policies towards Estonia.
Perceptions and accusations.
Thus, while Estonia started to re-build a nation state on historical legacy and its perception of Russia was in general connected with the moral feeling of injustice caused by Russia in the past, then Russia reacted from the present situation, on the basis of selective democratic principles of human rights and in turn had the moral feeling of unfairness in the treatment of Russian-speaking people which grounded in the Estonian present-day laws. The misunderstandings from both sides were caused by not corresponding value systems’ transitions. For example, Estonia could not comprehend why Russia – characterized by many analysts as apparently democratic – accused in the aggressive manner the small neighbouring country in the violation of human rights of the Russian-speakers and perceived Estonia as an enemy[10], why there was a delay in the Russian troops’ withdrawal until 1994 and why they were not removed right after the collapse of the USSR, why the border agreement was not signed when all the problems were settled, why Russia did not admit the occupation of Estonia in 1940 and why Russia did not acknowledge the Tartu peace treaty from 1920. From Russia’s side there was a misapprehension of Estonian language, citizenship and election laws. Estonia questioned mostly Estonian-Russian relational issues whereas Russia was suspicious about the Estonia’s domestic policies.
The first half of 1990s represented the complete differences in self-images (according orientations) and most highly polarized “other-images”, perceptions respectively of Estonia and Russia.
For the Estonians’ the self-image of their country represented it as a small Western, or European country (from historical line of interpretation) with potential success (sui generis explanation) and Russia – the Eastern (non-European), dangerous one (also historical clarification). At the beginning of Estonian-Russian relations, for Estonia the post-Soviet Russia had been acting rather contradictingly in the international politics: from one side, questing for the Western institutions (often for the specific status[11]) and from the other side, attacking Estonia (first of all on the issue of the violation of Russian-speaking minorities’ human rights). In addition, the social memory of the Russian expansionist past maintained the perception of Russia as a seemingly friendly and hugging Bear in the famous Zoo conflict of the Churchill’s fable story[12].
Russia’s self and other images were rather different from Estonia’s. At the beginning of 1990s Russia was domestically and internationally engaged in the self-identification search and joined various Western international organizations, in many cases as USSR successor state. Many authors called it Russian Western foreign policy orientation when in fact it was derived from the necessity to replace the sole post-Soviet foreign existence with some kind of international communication. Besides, it was first of all the emotional hurrah-optimism which overshadowed any reasonable explanation and forecast analysis of the circumstances right after the collapse of the USSR and the existence of the independent Russia in the international system of states. Nevertheless the reasons, Russia started the integration policies into the Western international institutions and most of the Russians’ imagined themselves as Western, identical to the democratic although the term democracy had and still has a variety of meanings in Russia. For Russia the other image in the pattern of Estonia was not so much a European or democratic country as it was an ex-Soviet republic like Russia itself. However, during the existence of the USSR Estonia alongside with the other two Baltic states of Latvia and Lithuania were by many people in the USSR considered as the Soviet (small) West. After the collapse of the Soviet Union an emotional feelings of anger dominated in many speeches, articles and statements of the president, foreign minister and other state high officials.
At the beginning of 1990’s, the aforementioned perceptions were transformed into official level accusations. The polarization of accusations as following: Estonia’s accusations of Russia – in Soviet/Russian occupation in 1940; in Russification during the Soviet period; in the imperialism in history; Russia accused Estonia in turn – in Estonization of Estonia, in ethnic cleansing, in violation of religious and ethnic rights, policy of apartheid and genocide.
Actors, values and society in the Estonian and Russian foreign policy making
As foreign policies are closely related with the states’ official policies the state-centered approach is definitely correct here. However, the intra-state foreign policy decision-making and concept development are often influenced by the foreign policy communities and may (and may not, depending on the case of a country) partly reach out to the societal level. The foreign policy principles, norms, doctrines, values base on the national political culture and are elaborated among the foreign policy community. The foreign policy community is usually the widest group of people (societal and state representatives, that is state and non-state elite included) who are connected with the foreign policy through interests or/and responsibilities. Foreign policy communities usually include intellectual, economic or business, judicial elite – all the people interested or who may profit from the foreign policy. As a result of the globalisation process, the group of people included into the foreign policy community has also widened.
The term – foreign policy elite – is relatively arguable as both parts, foreign policy and elite – have been broadened within the development of the democratic societies and states, the international system itself. Usually the foreign policy elites include the state’s political and administrative leadership that is highest political decision-making level (government, parliament, president, or other state institutions, agents, depending on the polity arrangements) and the realization through the foreign ministries. In different countries elite (including foreign policy elite) characteristics may be unlike.
Significant role has been played by the independent intellectuals-analysts or experts (non-state, intellectual elite) who may also participate in the development of foreign policy basic ideas, principles, programmes, concepts etc. Especially influential has it been in various countries in transition from Soviet-authoritarian regime to democratic rule of law.
In 1990s Estonian and Russian foreign policy communities were and still are considerably unlike. Estonia foreign policy community was logically smaller than the Russian one, ethnically rather homogeneous (Estonian-dominated) and the share of the national foreign policy analysts-experts in the community was minor, its influence – close to zero. The foreign policy principles, doctrines, orientations, perspectives and concepts etc. were prepared within the administrative framework of the Estonian Foreign Ministry. At the same time, the explanation of the fact is also simple – the small country had not many academics and journalists who were involved in foreign policy matters (teaching specific foreign policy courses and writing on concrete foreign policy issues). Nevertheless, the foreign policy primary goals – the European and Euro-Atlantic integration have usually were or less agreed by most of the indigenous people. The perception of Russia as a potential threat to the state’s sovereignty made the Estonians supportive to the official Western-oriented foreign policy. Besides the state- bureaucratic and non-state intellectual elites, there is also a third (p)layer – the non-state economic elite. Estonian economic elite was (and still is) divided according to their foreign business geography: Western and Eastern. The last were the businessmen whose trade partners were in Russia and were interested in the more friendly foreign (economic) relations between Estonia and Russia.
On the other hand, Russian foreign policy community and public interest in the foreign policy was unlike to the Estonian experience. As being occupied with national and international self-identification problems Russia was (and still is) “intensely inward-looking society, preoccupied with domestic affairs[13]. International politics were left to the experts and columnists in Russia.
Russian foreign (and security) policy was the domain of special foreign policy community. This community has been rather “privileged” and has involved political and economic elites, journalists and academicians working on the foreign and security policy issues. However, the non-governmental elite in Russia has been to a certain degree questionable, especially how independent it was as the state was dominating in many spheres of social (societal) life and therefore the elite, especially the economic and sometimes academic, was related to the state. E.g. economic elite was dependable on political institutions or more precisely on the high positioned political individuals; several outstanding academic elite representatives in turn were counselling (or are doing it) the president etc.
Russian foreign policy community (state and non-state elite) was ethnically far less homogeneous than the Estonian corresponding group. It included the President himself and his associates (advisers, Presidential Council and administration members), Foreign Minister and the higher level officials of the Foreign Ministry, and some other state institutions involved in foreign policy issues as well as business elite, oligarchs.
Besides, being varied, the foreign policy community in addition, unlike to the Estonian one, did not have any social memory or historic experience of democracy had together with the whole society went through several phases of value changes and value orientations’ transformations. Russian researcher Valdimir Lapkin has proposed three stages of value changes for the Russians[14] (including those from the wider foreign policy community) since the Soviet values during Gorbachev’s perestroika. 1990-1993 meant the collapse of the de-ideologized values, development of liberal democratic values and increase in political culture (human rights, liberty as a values e.g.). Some values were transformed, like patriotism, equality. The period is also characterized by the division of people into the conflicting groups of the democrats and the anti-democrats. This period was followed in 1994-1997 with the new conflicts between the elite and mass values and between the age groups’ values[15] and was followed with the third stage since 1998 when the elite groups themselves differentiated and fell into various subgroups. The same happened to the masses and their contradicting values. There have been various value orientation classifications for Russian society in the academic literature.
On the official level as well as among the foreign policy community and wider public opinion Estonian and Latvian legislation and administrative practices had been seen as systematic human rights abuses.[16] The Estonian foreign policy was described By Y.Primakov as “discriminatory practices”[17]. According to the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in State Duma Dmitri Rogozin the Baltic states (including Estonia) were going to face a serious problem to preserve their national identity as their own elite was “still weak, the national entrepreneurship (business) – primitive”.[18]
Russian academic, research center, institutions, scholars dedicated their works to the explanation of the Russian (political, ethnic) nation and geopolitical perspectives;[19] some analysed the Russia’s national interests,[20] Russia and the Slavonic countries relationships and cooperation perspectives[21]. Perhaps one of the most visible societal patterns (however in/directly linked to the power structures) has been the non-governmental Council for Foreign and Defense Policy (founded in 1992) – an institution that once aimed at the support of government in foreign policy designs and has involved politicians, civil servants, entrepreneur, academicians over the years of functioning.
The Council produced at least three publicly known documents on the Baltic-Russian relations at the end of 1990s: “The Long-Term Line of Relations with the Baltic States” (1997)[22], “Russia and the Baltic States II: Basic Problems Between the States of the Region” (1999)[23] and “Baltics – the Trans-European “Corridor”: 21st Century” (2000)[24]. These documents were different and alike at the same time. They all fixed the international development of the year of publication. They all stressed the multipolar world order. They all dealt with the Baltic states domestic problems, with the risks for Russia, with the issue of possible NATO expansion to the Baltic states. In the first document a plan of differentiated attitude towards the three Baltic states was proposed. The specific problems of Russian minorities in the Baltic states were stressed in the second and the necessity of reinforcement economic relations between Russia – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – in the third document.
Thus, while Estonian foreign policy concepts were (and still are) elaborated within the foreign ministry, in Russia the same was usually done within the Presidential administration, with the advisers, sometimes with the help of some advisory group and perhaps some influence has had also Russian Foreign Ministry. That is the formal framework of the Estonian and Russian foreign policy conceptual makings were based on different participants. In addition, although Russian society was not widely interested in the foreign policy issues, the elite values, have nevertheless were related rather than contradicted to the main value orientations in the Russian society. Therefore it is interesting to conclude that by the end of the 20th century the Russian society came to the consensus on the eclectic combination of values like paternalistic state, hostile Russia’s neighbourhood and the uniqueness of Russia itself[25]. Uniqueness was linked to geography, history, ethnicity and civilization.[26] These values, no doubt, had influence on the formation of the Russian foreign policy community and the elaboration of foreign-, security and defence policies on the whole and regarding Estonia which in turn was influenced by the general mood and value development in the society which also ended with the re-grouping of people according to the values. The values affect the attitudes and behaviour. According to the studies at the end of 1990s in Pskov region, the Russia’s closest neighbour to Estonia, the most positive attitudes towards Estonia were among those Russians who shared the centralist-democratic values and the most negative among the patriotic and ultra-conservative Russians[27].
Official Foreign Policies.
One of the basic differences in the Estonian and Russian foreign policies at the beginning of 1990s was the perception and understanding of Europe: Europe as an identity, a motive, a norm and a value. To a great extent Estonian foreign policy orientation towards European self-identification was motivated by the historical experience of Russian invasions.
Russian foreign policy, however, became “norm-generated cooperative “game””[28] of the present or normative self-identification which overwhelmingly concentrated on “Russia must become more like the West”.[29] That was different from the Estonia’s self-assured return to Europe. In addition, it did not mean Russia’s (immediate) integration into all possible European structures. The international (and domestic) self-identification quest for Russia started through the European values and perspectives and was later combined with the concept of interests and power: “Russia must be strong enough to defend its vital interests”.[30] The first document that supported the norms and interests was prepared by the Foreign Ministry as new Russia’s program in foreign policy at the beginning of 1993 and became a law in April 1993 under the title “The Key Tenets of the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation”. “The Tenets” focused (as all the next similar ones) on the domestic issues and fixed the spheres and location where Russia’s primary interests should be. The main priority was given to the prevention of any threat to Russia’s integrity, followed by geopolitical task of cooperation with CIS and moral responsibility of protection of the compatriots living abroad. Compatriots was a complicated programme which was formed over the years.
The normative bias of Russian foreign policy was characteristic to most of the Russian foreign policy programs, tenets, concepts since 1993 and they all together might be called as concepts anyway as they present the Russian foreign policy values, norms and principles. Not going into the conceptual details, developments and comparisons of those documents, the Russian foreign policy basics were presented in most of the documents as Russia – the great power should play vital role in the multipolar world system (order), Russia as a unique power on the Eurasian continent, being not European and far less Asian, having no enemies, should follow its national interests, first of all in the Commonwealth of the Independent States and also the defense of the national interests in the world and specially in the “Near abroad” a specific subconcept that was developed in 1992.
In the Russian official foreign policy concepts Estonia fell into the category of a state from Europe, from “Near Abroad” and at the beginning of 1990s they both dealt with the “other-image” as a hidden enemy, outspoken or not.
The Russia’s concept of vital interests regarding Estonia had two aspects: first, the most well-known geopolitical invention – the “Near Abroad” belonging to which Estonia plausibly tried to avoid and second – the so-called Karaganov Doctrine.
Broadly speaking the “near abroad” meant and still is “the former Soviet Union or at least its geopolitical space”.[31] It was (and is) also the sphere of Russia’s foreign policy priorities, of influence and possible interference and its national security zone all together. The notion itself became rather popular among the Russian politicians. The term “new abroad’ seemed to be favourite for the scholarly world[32] although for the politicians the notion “near abroad” was the same as “new abroad” and they both contrasted to the “traditional abroad”. Some scholars elaborated the term of “near abroad” into sub-categories like the “nearest abroad” (the Slavic countries of Byelorussia and Ukraine)[33] and the “further or far abroad” (the former East European Soviet bloc countries).[34] Nevertheless the usage of certain categories, in many cases Russian politicians were following the paradigm of interests, strength and power.[35] The hidden evaluation of the concept of “near abroad” (“new abroad”) was later postulated by the former Swedish prime minister C.Bildt who called it as a “temporary abroad” for Russia.[36] Estonian foreign minister has recently repeated the Russia’s possible attitude towards Estonia as a temporary abroad[37].
The so-called Karaganov doctrine was closely connected with the “Near Abroad” concept and dealt with the controversial minority-issue in Estonia. It’s basic ideas concluded the importance of the post-imperial role of Russia under the new circumstances and the re-integration of the disintegrated nations in the form of confederation[38] as a foreign policy goal for the democratic Russia. The doctrine concentrated on the concrete political means to be realised in the “Near Abroad” where Russia had to support the Russian speaking community to gain certain economic welfare. The “Near Abroad” became thus automatically Russia’s sphere of interest (and influence). In later years some elements of the Karaganov Doctrine (basically the protection of the rights of compatriots) were mainly supported by the State Duma and president. State Duma adopted several critical Directives towards Estonia and orders to the government to support the compatriots in Estonia but as the lower chamber of the Russian parliament lacked much of the power and therefore the responsibilities set by the State Duma were seldom realised. Additionally, in post-1993 period president Yeltsin signed several programmes to support the compatriots abroad but they were never started due to the vagueness of the target groups, or goals, or because of the overwhelmingly normative character of those and insufficiency of means. It was once also known as the Russian Monroe doctrine[39] for the similarities to the American foreign policy doctrine. Karaganov Doctrine was one of the most influential and the perhaps the most successful Russian foreign policy doctrine ever elaborated since Russia’s independence in 1991.
From the very beginning Estonian foreign policy dominantly focused on various arguments dependant on historical circumstances: from one side – it was the state building and re-establishment itself as a European nation-state; from another side, however, a threat-perception from the East (from Russia). At the beginning of the state building the latter was accompanied by the complicated negotiations over the issue of Russian troops withdrawal until they were removed in 1994 as a result of special treaties signed by the presidents of Estonia and Russia at the same year. The early basic principle of the Estonian foreign policy – “the return to Europe” (and to the European democratic values), changed slightly by mid-1990s when Estonia became an aspirant country to the EU and to the NATO. The alteration was caused by the norms of the international setting in Europe and in the wider Euro-Atlantic international space. The EU and NATO were transforming from the original goals to partly different spheres and principles – EU from economic cooperation also into political, legal and other spheres; NATO from particularly defence organization into an international co-operative security institutions (peacekeeping missions). In fact they both have turned towards security sphere and here and EU and NATO have settled normative requirements for the aspirant countries – to uphold (follow) the common (shared) values, interests and the risks which are related to the new, post-Cold war international circumstances. All aforenamed shared – factors insist upon the domination of international laws, the subordination of nationstate’s legislature under the superior international one. For Estonia the overall European integration in fact continuously meant a threat-defence aspect of security[40] although the Estonia’s first and until now the last security concept (2000) avoids to name any specific state as a threat to the state’s security, the concealed assumption, however, did not leave Russia outside of that perception of danger and vulnerability. Estonian foreign policy was (and still is) dominantly oriented to the West, lacking most of the activities (economic and other) in the East.
In the sense of security and internationally shared values, interests and risks, Russia was in a complicated situation in 1990s. Most of the foreign policy documents include security as the basic aspect of the current foreign policy of Russia. In those materials Russia’s main threats and risks to its security were presented as domestic (economic, demographic, criminal etc.). Russia’s domestic security risks have made it, however, more vulnerable to the potential international risks like illegal drug trafficking, illegal migration and weapon transfer. In addition, the weakness, helplessness and supposed uniqueness made Russia vulnerable towards the really mighty NATO. Although a small country, Estonia’s quest for NATO nevertheless, added feelings of defencelessness to Russia. And Russia itself was several times considering NATO memberships status.
(Soviet)Russian – NATO relations have been complicated and sometimes odd over the whole period of the existence of the North Atlantic Alliance. Although the Western defence organisation was established on the eve of Cold war and its basic goal was to protect the Western countries from the possible Soviet attack (invasion) the Soviet leaders occasionally showed interest to become members. Thus in 1949 Joseph Stalin himself interested in joining the organisation. In 1954 the Soviet leaders tried to apply for the membership but were sharply refused as the idea presented to some countries (namely US, Britain and France) weird and they explained that the Soviet request was of “unreal character”.[41] In autumn of 1991 Boris Yeltsin raised the question of Russia’s NATO membership in the North Atlantic Council[42]. Even Vice-president Aleksander Rutskoi was optimistic about Russia’s shortly coming NATO membership in autumn of 1991[43]. In 1999 in his interview to BBC Russian then acting president Putin considered the possibility of Russia’s NATO memberstate status as an option not to be excluded[44]. Russia’s NATO membership ideas were presented by Putin also in 2000 and in 2001.
On the other hand, NATO became an advancing ghost for vulnerable Russia and introduced the realists’ security dilemma into the new era: expanding and evolving NATO as a threat would influence Russia (not to expand) but to concentrate on the development of military that in turn may effect on NATO’s similar actions and going thus endlessly on and proving here the realist dilemma of “defensive offence” or “offensive defence”.
After the demise of the USSR and the establishment of Russia’s statehood independence it has mostly been afraid of losing its former position in the world as well as being treated by the West – as “the rest”.
It might be also interesting to analyse the following three views – the Western, Estonian and the Russian one and we see here some coincidence although it is spelled a little bit differently, nevertheless, they are close ideas and represent the ideology of “the rest”.
Authority patterns in the foreign policy
The transitions from the Soviet to the post-Soviet polity developments went through different stages. When Estonian development from Soviet-authoritarian state to the liberal democratic one was largely initiated from below, from the societal level (the first, one of the biggest and strongest Popular Front movement in the USSR was in Estonia) then Russia’s transition was more intellectual-elitarian and on the state-level from the Soviet president to the post-Soviet president or from Gorbachev to Yeltsin and further on to Putin.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union within the first year of independence Estonians adopted a new constitution and elected new (one chamber) parliament. According to the basic law Estonia was and is a parliamentarian republic. Theoretically, the chief foreign policy actors are the Prime minister and the cabinet, foreign ministry as the prime executive branch among the other ministries, the parliament (its foreign and security policy commissions) and the president as symbolic representative of the state. In reality, however, it has turned out that the main foreign policy actors in Estonia have been – the foreign ministry and the president, to lesser extent – the prime minister and the least – the regarding parliamentarian commissions.
Estonian Foreign Ministry was gradually established in 1991 by Lennart Meri, a former writer who also became Estonia’s first post-Soviet foreign minister and since 1992 – the president. In most of the Soviet period Estonia did not have its own foreign policy. At the end of 1980s there was a small foreign ministry where less than ten people were employed. After the Moscow coup in August 1991 and the reestablishment of the independent Estonian the Foreign Ministry was expanded, new people were engaged. Most of the personnel were young and relatively inexperienced in diplomacy and in foreign policy.
Nevertheless the novelty of the situation, there was consensus on the Western orientation of Estonian foreign and security policy[45] between the state (president, parliament, government) and majority of the society (political parties etc.)[46]. The Western democratic development model was almost unanimously accepted by all the leading political actors in Estonia. There were disagreements in details and in technical arrangements of diplomacy but almost no one ever questioned the general line of policy, the Western-orientation, the European identification. Estonia established European institutional membership status in the UN, CSCE/OSCE (both in 1991), Council of the Baltic Sea States (in 1992), North Atlantic Co-operation Council, NACC (1992), Council of Europe (in 1993), West European Union (1994). Gradually the return to Europe transformed also in the direction of the European Union and NATO as the prime goals in the foreign and security policy for the decade to come.
In Russia the case was somewhat different and more difficult to understand. Most of Russia’s history is a narrative of the autocratic, one-man authority pattern. In the Russian empire the Tsars possessed the absolute power, in the Soviet times – the CPSU leaders carried out their total command and control. However, one has to agree with Russell Bova who has indicated that already the post-Stalin Soviet Union was more oligarchic than autocratic[47], most of the decisions (including foreign policy resolutions) were made by the Politburo, a group of party elites in the USSR.
Right after the collapse of the USSR Russia’s transition from Soviet authoritarianism (to democracy?) on the state level presented an obvious pattern of conflict between two power institutions – the Supreme Soviet (Russian first post-Soviet parliament) and the president. In fact, both institutions started at the Soviet period – the Russian president in 1990 (?) and the Supreme Soviet was elected in 1990. Russian Supreme Soviet, the legislative branch was a centralized hierarchical body organized through committees and lacked any form of partisan factions[48]. The authority was carried out by the chairman and the members of the Presidium.
Most of the power ambiguities in the newly independent Russia originated from two factors: first, then existing and constantly amended Russian constitution (effective since 1978) allowed legislature to intervene into the executive policies and the parliamentarians in turn had bestowed (in 1992) president with the right to adopt certain laws in the form of the presidential decrees; second – both institutions were chaired by contradicting authoritarian leaders – Ruslan Khasbulatov as the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and Boris Yeltsin as the president of Russian Federation. The foreign policy matters were one of the many aspects of those controversies within the dual leadership situation in Russia. The power ambiguity between the parliament and president ended with the political crisis and with the adoption of the new constitution in December 1993 according to which the chief foreign policy actor (as well in many other areas) became the president alone. The Foreign Policy concept of 2000 clearly fixed the Russian foreign policy actors as the president (the chief foreign policy actor), the parliament (the legislature on foreign policy), the Security Council (dealing with the security aspects of the foreign policy) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the chief coordinative role[49].
However, while Estonian Foreign Ministry has been practically the central actor in foreign policy making, in Russia there were various foreign policy actors that all together formed the unlike foreign policy community. Foreign Ministry was rather visible but far from central player in all foreign policy making (activities) in Russia at that period. Often foreign policy “was formulated and implemented without the participation of Foreign Ministry”[50]. According to the Russian analyst A.Migranyan Russia’s foreign policy in 1991/1992 – 1994 was disorganized, messy and confused because the foreign policy institutional transition from the Soviet Union to post-Cold war Russia was not a continuous process[51]. In the Soviet Union the most important foreign policy decisions as such were made in the Foreign Relations Department of the Central Committee of CPSU. In the Post-Soviet Russia the Foreign Ministry staff changed quickly: “in a relatively short period, many top figures in the ministry lost their positions. In terms of the scale of changes in personnel, the ministry had not experienced anything comparable since Stalin’s notorious purges in the 1930s. Meanwhile, careers were made almost overnight not only in the ministry itself but also in the embassies and other offices abroad.”[52] Misinterpretation of the ministerial operationability has given a wrong impression about Russia’s foreign policy of the period as over-estimated pro-Western. In fact, two partly unlike issues (domains)- the foreign policy and diplomacy – are mixed here. As indicated by A.Migranyan foreign minister Kozyrev was reiterating that the Foreign Ministry carried out presidential foreign policy whereas president was desperately relying on Foreign Ministry which, however, was not capable to elaborate basic foreign policy principles[53] because of the Soviet-experienced diplomatic staff or highly incompetent post-Soviet personnel. In 1991-1993 there were other significant players in the Russian official foreign policy community besides the Russian Foreign Ministry, like the Security Council (established in summer 1992); the Foreign Policy Commission (the end of 1992); the Presidential Council (the beginning of 1993). In addition, the Ministry of Defence performed abroad issues, which clearly could be classified as belonging to the foreign ministry’s competency and that indicated the presence of complex rivalry between those two ministries.
One of the main critics of the Foreign Ministry and A.Kozyrev was the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations Committee of the Supreme Soviet. As the members of the last were simplistically and overwhelmingly considered the derzhavniks (great Russia’s advocates, and in most of the cases they, in fact, were) and pro-Soviet conservatives then logically the offended party became “liberal”, “internationalist” Westernizers in the Russia’s new Foreign Ministry[54]. Along the same lines of consideration, Russian so-called Westernizers “advocated a conciliatory, non-interventionist, even isolationist stand vis-à-vis the Near Abroad…”[55] However, in numerous Estonia-offensive publications (speeches, statements, articles, comments) by Kozyrev[56] we can in the same way easily evaluate him as non-Western, non-liberal and non-democratic. In addition, the former Russian ambassador to Israel A.Bovin has disclosed Kozyrev as an incompetent foreign minister[57]. The negative (or chaotic) pattern of Foreign Ministry’s (and minister’s) international behaviour is also the long and complicated negotiation process with NATO over the Russia’s particular status in PfP agreement in 1994-1995. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that the post-Cold war Russian foreign policy should be divided into two separate periods – the Western oriented (Andrey Kozyrev’s Atlanticist, liberal policy until approximately 1995) and pragmatic, moderate-national (since Yevgeni Primakov in 1996).[58]
The state-centred approach in Russian foreign policy analysis, however, presumes the division of transition period in 1990s into two different models based on two unlike constitutions. The first one, recurrently amended Soviet Russian constitution of 1978 was valid until the end of 1993 and allowed double authority pattern of the parliament and President. The adoption of the new constitution in 1993 clearly fixed the responsibilities of all the power institutions in Russia. Russia became a federal republic with enormously large presidential powers. Since 1993 the statist position became stronger, the disorganized foreign policy decision-making /process?, however, continued. In this vacuum of foreign policy actors some new institutions (connected with the foreign policy) were established and the foreign policy (official) decision-making community was gradually modified. Even in this transformed foreign policy system Russian Foreign Ministry did not always play significant role besides being a coordinator[59].
What is the present-day Russia’s authority pattern? Philip G.Roeder places Russia to the group of balanced republics [60]. According to the new constitution of 1993, Russia became a presidential republic where supreme (ultimate) authority in every sphere, including foreign policy is vested in presidency. The power execution, however, has been to a certain degree divided between the president and the cabinet (prime minister, deputy prime ministers and federal ministers). Whereas the economic, social, cultural issues are of cabinet concern, foreign, security and defence questions belong directly to the president’s realm together (through) various institutional domestic institutions like the Security Council (established in 1992), Foreign Policy Council (1995), Defence Council (1996), Foreign Intelligence Service. In this sense foreign policy is a solo of the president and depends largely on the individual values and attitudes. President Yeltsin was fairly ill during his second term of presidency and most of the foreign policy was left to the cabinet and namely to the foreign minister Primakov. Not going into the details of Primakov’s value orientations or attitudes, it has to be admitted that Primakov’s legacy means first of all institutional changes. He managed to fix the foreign ministry’s role as one of the supreme and consolidating actors in the Russian foreign policy process and institutional system. Whoever had taken the position in 1996 had to carry out the same policies realised by him although it is not clear whether the institutional reform could have taken place. In addition Allen C.Lynch has also indicated that Primakov actually “continued Kozyrev’s balancing act”[61] in the Russian foreign policy referring to the changes that took place from 1993 onward and did not start just with the arrival of the new foreign minister in 1996.
Estonian-Russian relations: church and business
Church and business were two areas of Estonian-Russian relations where non-state actors actively intervened into the state-led relations between Estonia and Russia in 1990s. These two fields were also closely related in 1996.
The problems with Russian Orthodox church in Estonia (the refusal of Estonian authorities to register Russian Orthodox Church because of the similarity of the name to the already registered Constantinople church and the Russian Orthodox Church’s reluctance to follow the recommendations) increased the negative statements and accusations by the Russian authorities. Aleksii II,[62] the Tallinn-born Russian Orthodox Church patriarch in Moscow protected the rights of Russian-speaking minorities and registration of the Constantinople (Byzantine) Orthodox Church in Estonia. The hidden cause of the conflict was, however, the land ownership. Constantinople Orthodox church had had approximately five percent of the total land in the Estonian republic in 1920s and 1930s. At the beginning of 1990s Estonia restored land ownership and therefore, the legal successor of the Orthodox church of the pervious Estonian republic would be presently a significant landowner in the small country.
The Estonian businessmen, in turn, tried to mediate the Estonian-Russian officially modest relations because Russia had introduced double taxation on goods imported from Estonia. In 1996 a delegation of Estonian top businessmen visited even Patriarch Aleksii II with the request to assist in negotiating with the Russian authorities but was refused in such an act. The violation of human rights in Estonia were given as motive for refusal.
In 2001 Estonian and Russian businessmen again tried to get involved in foreign policy and arranged two meetings in Estonia – between the business and the parliamentary delegations. The Estonian authorities (the prime minister and foreign ministry), however, took little notice in the convention.
Conclusions.
Estonian – Russian relations are first of all state-to state relations where the authority pattern dominates. The foreign policy authority pattern, however, is influenced by various independent variables (factors) like international setting, value orientations in the wider society within the country, by the links between the society and foreign policy community and by the specific characteristics of the foreign policy community (especially state and non-state elites and their relations) in one or another country .
Estonia and Russia were (and still are) two unlike states. Estonia was (is) a parliamentarian republic, Russia a federal republic with strong presidential powers (the so-called superpresidential republic). While Estonian foreign policy making has been concentrating in the foreign ministry the Russian foreign policy process has been more complicated pattern. The Russian foreign policy making has included President, his administration (advisors), foreign and defence ministries (including ministers), several other state agencies and non-state councils although the latter was indirectly linked to the president in 1990s. The controversial and unconstructive foreign policy towards Estonia was partly caused by the complex foreign policy pattern in Russia in 1990s.
Polity arrangements in Estonia and in Russia, however, were settled in the constitutions which were accepted in different times and in unlike situations. The times and situations were connected with the transitional periods from Soviet regime to democracies which differed in Estonia and Russia. Estonians’ dual value system guaranteed speedy shift from Soviet values to Western democratic ones. Foreign policy of Russia has been one of the most clear symbiosis of Soviet style and new Russian state with democratic element emanated form rise and development of the society. Russia’s lack of democratic experience in the past made the concrete self-identification more complicated and that in turn was one of the factors that caused contradictory and negative foreign policy towards Estonia.
Estonia’s European self-identification, from one side, and the perception of the concealed Russian threat (which based mostly on historical practices), from the other side, caused among the state-elite negative attitudes and reactions in the first half of 1990s and more sophisticated and inactive attitude in the second half.
In its self-identification ambiguity process Russia has, however, theoretically produced and published a series of documents on foreign, security and defence policies while Estonia after its Western identification adopted only one document – the National Security Concept in 2000. Therefore the search for identity and foreign policy orientations in Russia could be also analysed on the basis of those documents whereas Estonia logically lacks foreign policy programme documents for the transition period.
The societal intervention into the relations between the states of Estonia and Russia have ended with failure. Thus, the Estonian businessmen’s attempt to mediate the relations through the Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Aleksii II in Moscow in 1996 was unsuccessful and in the same ineffective way resulted the meetings of the Estonian and Russian businessmen and parliamentarians in 2001.
The current Estonian-Russian relations are reminiscent of a stable vacuum; they are sensitively complicated and waiting for the resolution.
REFERENCES
[1] See: Estonian language books on East-Locarno Pact ideas in the end of 1920s.
[2] see Christer Pursiainen. “Russian Foreign Policy and International Relations Theory, Ashgate, 2000, p.3
[3] O.F.Knudsen. “Security on the Great Power Fringe: Dilemmas Old and New. In: O.F.Knudsen (ed.).Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region. Russia, Nordic and European Aspects. London, Frank Cass, 1999
[4] see Christer Pursiainen. “Russian Foreign Policy and International Relations Theory, Ashgate, 2000, p.49
[5] See Helmut Hubel:. “The European union, the Baltic States and Post-Soviet Russia: Theoretical Problems and possibilities of Developing Partnership Relations in the North-Eastern Baltic Sea Region”, in: O.F.Knudsen (ed.).Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region. Russia, Nordic and European Aspects. London, Frank Cass, 1999, pp.241-256, Christer Pursiainen; …
[6] See: M.Haab, O. Zhurjari, P.Vares, Olav F.Knudsen, etc. to be added…
[7] For example, Estonia was one of the first countries of the world to provide Jews with the rights of cultural autonomy in 1925.
[8] Many Estonian families had so-called Western relatives who had emigrated from the republic before the Soviet troops re-entered Estonia in 1944 to different countries and were in mail contact with the Estonians during the soviet period.
[9] The Finnish TV was technically possible to watch in the Northern Estonia and in the capital – Tallinn since the beginning of 1970s.
[10] See: Estonia as an enemy in the polls in …
[11] As the USSR successor state Russia received the place in the Security Council of the United Nations, Russia also tried to re-organize OSCE to get more weight in the international organization in 1994.
[12] The fable from 1928 describes the animals’ disarmament conference in the Zoo. The Rhinoceros, the Buffalo, the Stag, the Porcupine, the Lion, the Tiger and small animals were arguing which weapons (teeth, horns, claws etc.) could be allowed and which not. In the middle of the argument the Bear stepped in and proposed a friendly hug. The proposal was innocent but caused panic among the smaller animals. After that all started to argue even more furiously. Finally the keepers put the animals back into their cages and they calmed down. (see in: “The Irresistible Churchill”. Compiled by Kay Halle. Robson Books, 2000, p.89.).
[13] See Leon Aron. “Foreign Policy Doctrine of Postcommunist Russia”; in: Michael Mandelbaum(ed). The New Russian Foreign Policy. A Council of Foreign Relations Book, NY, 1998, p.35
[14] “Pro et Contra”, tom 4, No.2. “Preobraozovanija v Rossii : itogi desjatiletija”, M,1999. Seal Vladimir Lapkin (on veel autoreid – Vladimir Pantin – kontrollida?). “Tsennostnoje orientatsii Rossijan” (p.144-160).
[15] “Pro et Contra”, tom 4, No.2. “Preobraozovanija v Rossii : itogi desjatiletija”, M,1999. Seal Vladimir Lapkin (on veel autoreid – Vladimir Pantin – kontrollida?). “Tsennostnoje orientatsii Rossijan” p.153.
[16] Sherman W.Garnett. “Russia and the West in the New Borderlands”. In: Michael Mandelbaum(ed). The New Russian Foreign Policy. A Council of Foreign Relations Book, NY, 1998, p.68
[17] Garnett lk.81.
[18] Baltic News Service, May 29, 2001.
[19] Дугин. “Основы геополитики”, М, 1997.
[20] See e.g. Oleg Arin (in Russian).
[21] See Sergei Karaganov and the others
[22] See “Nezavissimaja gazeta”…
[23] “Nezavissimaja gazeta”, No.9, October 13, 1999, p.14
[24] “Nezavissimaja Gazeta”; Dipkurjer; no.16, October 26, 2000, p.12.
[25] L.G.Byzoov. “Pervyje kontury “postperehodnoi epohi”. In: Sotsiologicheskie Issledovanija”. No.4, 2001, p.4.
[26] See the whole volume: G.A.Arbatov, A.D.Bogaturov, A.V.Kortunov etc. “Vneshnyaya politika I bezopasnost sovremennoi Rossii”. Tom 1, kniga 1, M.1999.
[27] A.G.Manakov and T.M.Ivanova. “Politicheskie subkultury Pskovskoi oblasti”. In: “Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya”, No.8, 2000, p.51.
[28] Coit D.Blacker.”Russia and the West”; in: Michael Mandelbaum (ed). The New Russian Foreign Policy. A Council of Foreign Relations Book, NY, 1998, p.177.
[29] Coit D.Blacker.”Russia and the West”; in: Michael Mandelbaum (ed). The New Russian Foreign Policy. A Council of Foreign Relations Book, NY, 1998, p.173.
[30] Ibid, p.173
[31] “Postimees”, December18, 1993, p.7.a
[32] the insight of the foreign policy situation in Russia by the head of the Foreign Commission of the Estonian parliament V.Saatpalu in “Postimees” July 21, 1994, p.2.
[33] A.Karatnycky. The “Nearest Abroad”… , pp.69-85.
[34] K.E.Sorokin. Russia’s Gepolitics…. , pp.23-39.
[35] V.Glushin. And There Will Be An Imperial Russia . “Nezavissimaya Gazeta”, September 17, 1993.
[36] “The Baltic Litmus Test”. In: “Foreign Affairs” vol.73, No.5, 1994, September/October, p.81.
[37] Estonian daily “Postimees”, August 7, 2001.
[38] It should be noted here that most of the confederation (with some exceptions like the Swiss Confederation in 13th-18th centuries in history have very quickly developed into the federations, sometimes with the unitary tendencies.
[39] Speech by the President of Estonia Lennart Meri in Stuttgard on May 1993.
[40] Ole Weaver “European Security Identities 2000”; in: J.Peter Burgess and Ola Tunander. “European Security Identities. Contested Understandings of EU and NATO. PRIO Report 2/2000, p.31
[41] Baltic News Service, BNS news.- June 17, 2001.
[42] Välispoliitika I, lk.3
[43] Helmut Hubel. “The European Union, the Baltic States and Post-Soviet Russia”. In: Olav F.Knudsen. Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region. Russian, Nordic and European Aspects. London: Frank Cass, 1999, p.251.
[44] PM; March 6, 2000
[45] Siia viited panna.
[46] Excpet the Russian-speaking community in Estonia. The Russian-speakers who present ca 40 per cent of the total population have been generally against NATO but at the same time they have also been bigger supporter of EU than the Estonians according to various sociological research results in 1999-2000 and in spring-summer 2001.
[47] See Hoffman, p.182
[48] Joel M.Ostrow. Comparing Post-Soviet Legislatures. A Theory of Institutional Design and Political Conflict. Ohio State University Press, Columbus 2000, p.35.
[49] http://www.ln.mid.ru/website/ns-osndoc.nsf/osnvnpol – July 14, 2001.
[50] Mikhail E.Berzukov. “Institutional Mechanisms of Russian Foreign Policy”. In: Leon Aron and Kenneth M.Jensen (eds.). “The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy”. United States Peace Research Institute, Washington DC, 1994, p.69.
[51] A.M.Migranyan. “Vneshnyaya politika Rossii. Katastrofitcheskie itogi tryoh let”. In: G.A.Arbatov, A.D.Bogaturov etc.(eds.). “Vneshnyaya politika I bezopasnost’ sovremennoi Rossii”. Tom 1, kniga 1, p.176.
[52] Mikhail E.Berzukov. “Institutional Mechanisms of Russian Foreign Policy”. In: Leon Aron and Kenneth M.Jensen (eds.). “The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy”. United States Peace Research Institute, Washington DC, 1994, p.68.
[53]A.M.Migranyan. “Vneshnyaya politika Rossii. Katastrofitcheskie itogi tryoh let”. In: G.A.Arbatov, A.D.Bogaturov etc.(eds.). “Vneshnyaya politika I bezopasnost’ sovremennoi Rossii”. Tom 1, kniga 1, p….
[54] See e.g. Leon Aron, Kenneth M.Jensen (eds.) The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy. United States Institute of Peace Research, Washington DC, 1994, p.19.
[55] See e.g. Leon Aron, Kenneth M.Jensen (eds.) The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy. United States Institute of Peace Research, Washington DC, 1994, p.20.
[56] Siia lisada viide …
[57] See Alexander Bovin. “Pjat’ ljet sredi …”, M.2000, p.
[58] See …
[59] http://www.ln.mid.ru/website/ns-osndoc.nsf/osnvnpol – 14 Jyly, 2001.
[60] Philp G.Roeder. “Transitions from Communism: State-Centered Approaches”. In: Harry Eckstein, Frederic J.Fleron Jr.; Erik P.Hoffmann and William M.Reisinger. “Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia: Explorations in State-Society Relations”. Rowman and Littlefield Publ., NY, 1998, p.215.
[61] Allen C.Lynch. “The Realism in Russia’s Foreign Policy”. In: “Europe-Asia studies”, vol.53, No.1, January, 2001, p.22.
[62] Aleksii II – Estonian born (1929) Russian Orthodox Church’ patriarch is a potential and rightful Estonian citizen whose father was the Constantinople Orthodox Church priest.